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INTRODUCTION
"[T] here is an implicit narrative which the viewer is left to complete in
his imagination. That is why it is important that the striptease not end in
a bathing suit, because a bathing suit is for swimming, not 
for sex."'
There are likely few groups who, while enjoying a vivid academic
exchange in the much-celebrated marketplace of ideas, will be inter-
rupted by one member's call to move the debate to a nearby all-nude
dance club for additional intellectual perspective. Similarly, while
some might be disappointed, it is unlikely that any citizen would be
irreparably harmed by the closing of their local "Kandyland" go-go.
So now, after years of exhaustive debate and the perpetually promi-
nent role of explicit adult entertainment in the pantheon of First
Amendment scholarship, why all the fuss about another nude dancing
case? The answer is complex, yet it is instructive as to the degree First
Amendment jurisprudence has gone awry. In this Comment, I con-
tend the state of the First Amendment, viewed through the instructive
lens of adult entertainment, is far from strong. I argue that, despite
the basic First Amendment value that even the most unpopular and
perhaps unnecessary expression need be preserved in the face of the
suppressive force of a majority,2 the Supreme Court has taken pro-
foundly disturbing steps in City of Erie v. Pap's A.M. toward moving it-
self from the position of First Amendment rights guarantor and into
the position of disinterested spectator of government-imposed majori-
tarian preferences. Plainly spoken, the plurality's manipulation of
I RdCHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 364 (1992).
2 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("It
is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears."); OWEN M.
Fiss, LIBERALISM DMDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER
12 (1996) (describing the First Amendment as "a means of protecting the individual
speaker from being silenced by the state").
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doctrine, precedent, and justifications in Pap's has grave implications
for the freedom of any expression that challenges societal orthodoxy.
A thorough foray into modern First Amendment doctrine unques-
tionably must consider the pernicious effect of Pap's' on underlying
free speech values. Indeed, adult expression doctrine is an excellent
avenue for examination of the larger state of the First Amendment;
explicit adult entertainment occupies a unique place among forms of
expression because such a large portion of the populace allegedly dis-
favors it under many different social, political, and religious rubrics.4
Constitutional protection of adult entertainment is also an issue of
critical import as increasing numbers of municipalities attempt urban
renewal initiatives that include regulations designed to relocate or
3 City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
4 Some might suggest that adult expression doctrine has been played out over the
years in scholarly discussion. Not only has adult expression doctrine taken on a dis-
turbing new life in Pap's, but it will continue to shape First Amendment jurisprudence
in the near future through further consideration of secondary effects, Internet, and
child pornography issues. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 222
F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding as a matter of law that ordinances of the City of
Los Angeles prohibiting the operation of adult businesses that both sell adult products
and contain facilities for the viewing of adult movies or videos were inadequately sup-
ported by evidence of adverse impact so as to violate the First Amendment), cert.
granted, 69 U.S.L.W. 3591 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2001) (No. 00-799) (argued Dec. 4, 2001);
ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000) (barring enforcement of the Child Online
Protection Act, which makes it unlawful to make any communication for commercial
purposes by means of the World Wide Web that is available to minors and that in-
cludes material that is "harmful to minors" on First Amendment grounds because it
relies on community standards to identify material that is harmful to minors), cert.
granted sub nom. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 69 U.S.L.W. 3739 (U.S. Sept. 7, 2001) (No. 00-1293)
(argued Nov. 28, 2001); Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999),
cert. granted sub nom. Holder v. Free Speech Coalition, 69 U.S.L.W. 3495 (U.S. Sept. 7,
2001) (No. 00-795) (argued as Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, Oct. 30, 2001) (hold-
ing that the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, which prohibits the shipment,
distribution, receipt, reproduction, sale, or possession of any visual depiction that "ap-
pears to be[] of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct," and also contains a
similar prohibition concerning any visual depiction that is "advertised, promoted, pre-
sented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression that the
material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit con-
duct" is unconstitutional under the First Amendment); Amy Adler, Inverting the First
Amendment, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 921, 921 (2001) (asserting child pornography law is the
next major First Amendment battleground).
Changes in adult expression doctrine in recent and forthcoming decisions will
have great import above and beyond the mere perpetuation of the salacious striptease
or publication of the enticing erotic image. To borrow from a more talented source, I
would say about explicit adult expression: "You've begun to matter more than the
things you say." Andrew Lloyd Webber, Heaven on Their Minds, on JESUS CHRIST
SUPERSTAR (MCA Records 1993).
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suppress a growing number of adult-oriented businesses.6 "As of Feb-
ruary 1997, Americans spend more money at strip clubs than at
Broadway, off-Broadway, regional, and non-profit theaters; than at the
opera, the ballet, and jazz and classical music performances-com-
bined."7 As such, the use of zoning" and general laws9 to limit or elimi-
nate adult entertainment establishments is a particularly thorny issue
because it inextricably involves conflicts between passionate defenders
and equally fervent detractors, as well as difficult questions of moral-
ity, government censorship, and legislative motive.'0 Even the most
In New York City, for example, the total number of adult bookstores, peepshows,
and video stores increased from twenty-nine to eighty-nine between 1984 and 1993;
topless and nude bars increased from fifty-four to sixty-eight; and adult video estab-
lishments increased from none to sixty-four-overall an increase of more than forty-
seven percent. See NEW YORK CITY DEP'T OF CITY PLANNING, ADULT ENTERTAINMENT
STUDY 1, 21 (1994). The New York study also predicted large-scale growth through
2002. Id. I grant that no study has yet reliably determined whether the implied rela-
tionship between increased business and increased patronage is one of correlation or
causation. More than ever, however, it seems impossible to ignore Foucault's observa-
tion that modern society speaks about sex "ad infinitum, while exploiting it as the se-
cret." I MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 35 (Rob-
ert Hurley trans., 1978).
6 Although the focus of this Comment is on nude dancing establishments, I will at
times use "adult-oriented businesses" or "adult establishments," which unless specified
as "adult theatres" or "nude dancing establishments" may include video and book
stores; motels; massage parlors; sex clubs; topless, bottomless, and nude bars; and
peepshows. If you desire a frame of reference for nude dancing establishments, view a
modern one by using the Internet to visit <www.fantasyshowbar.com>.
7 Margot Rutman, Exotic Dancers'Employment Law Regulations, 8 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 515, 516 (1999).
8 New York City's "Quality of Life Initiative" is an excellent example of such a gov-
ernmental zoning scheme. Launched in 1995, it was accompanied by the city's Adult
Zoning Resolution, which, generally, restricted adult establishments to manufacturing
districts and banned adult businesses from most commercial districts. It also prohib-
ited adult establishments from operating within five hundred feet of a church, school,
residence, or another adult establishment. For a thorough explanation of the resolu-
tion, see Rachel Simon, Note, New York City's Restrictive Zoning of Adult Businesses: A
Constitutional Analysis, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 187, 190-92 (1995), which cites Resolu-
tion No. 1322. See also Howard Goldman & Rachel D. Tanur, Zoning for Adult Use: A
Delicate Balance: New York City Proposes Tough New Restrictions, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 14, 1994, at
S1 (describing New York City zoning initiatives from the mid-1970s forward); Vivian S.
Toy, Council Approves Package of Curbs on Sex Businesses, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1995, at Al
(relating the New York City Council's approval of the Adult Zoning Resolution).
9 For examples of these types of laws, see infra notes 22 & 100 on the laws consid-
ered in Barnes and Pap's.
10 See generally Timothy M. Tesluk, Barnes v. Glen Theatre: Censorship? So What?,
42 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1103 (1992) (describing Barnes as a case fundamentally about
free expression); Daniel J. McDonald, Note, Regulating Sexually Oriented Businesses: The
Regulatory Uncertainties of a "Regime of Prohibition by Indirection" and the Obscenity Doctrines
Communal Solution, 1997 BYU L. REV. 339 (defining sexually-oriented businesses as
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principled legal debates on the topic are usually "fraught with some
emotionalism.""
Until the early 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court did not acknowl-
edge protection for nude dancing; states were free to enact any limita-
tions they desired. 12 Since then, a fierce debate has raged over the
level of protection owed to nonobscene adult expression under the
First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Although the Court has
consistently held that nude dancing is entitled to some degree of First
Amendment protection, over the last thirty years it has developed,
adapted, and continually expanded a line of doctrine that has granted
broad discretion to local governments to suppress that expression as a
means to combat deleterious "secondary effects."' 4 Prominent com-
mentators have derided this doctrine as a "gravely erod[ing] the First
Amendment's protections''1 and have decried its "corrosive impact " 6
purveyors of obscenity and premising a need for regulation thereon).
n Pap's, 529 U.S. at 314 (SouterJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
12 Lisa Malmer, Nude Dancing and the First Amendment, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1275,
1276 (1991); see also id. at 1276 n.9 (collecting cases supporting this proposition). Ob-
scenity convictions in general did not occur prior to the late 1800s. See Fred K. Berger,
Pornography, Sex, and Censorship, in FREEDOM, RIGHTS, AND PORNOGRAPHY: A
COLLECTION OF WORKS BY FRED K. BERGER 132 (Bruce Russell ed., 1991) (discussing
the history of obscenity convictions). For details on the historical evolution of obscen-
ity doctrine, see the articles collected in PORN 101: EROTICISM, PORNOGRAPHY, AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 535-74 (James Elias ed., 1999) [hereinafter PORN 101]. For a
comprehensive documentary history of obscenity cases and statutes from 1960-1998,
see FREE EXPRESSION IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 150-208 (Sheila Suess
Kennedy ed., 1999).
13 See generally Vincent Blasi, Six Conservatives in Search of the First Amendment: The
Revealing Case of Nude Dancing, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 611 (1992) (discussing the First
Amendment issue presented by topless dancing); Gianni P. Servodidio, The Devaluation
of Nonobscene Eroticism as a Form of Expression Protected by the First Amendment, 67 TUL. L.
REV. 1231 (1993) (noting the debate over the proper meaning and proper regulation
of pornographic expression); Tesluk, supra note 10 (arguing for a First Amendment
right to expression); Simon, supra note 8 (describing a government scheme to restrict
the locations of adult establishments).
14 For a detailed explication of the evolution of nude dancing doctrine through
Barnes, see David L. Hudson, Jr., The Secondary Effects Doctrine: "The Evisceration of First
Amendment Freedoms", 37 WASHBURN L.J. 55, 57-77 (1997); Maimer, supra note 12, at
1275-1305; Michael McBride, Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie: The Wrong Route to the Right
Decision, 33 AKRON L. REv. 289, 290-98 (2000); Servididio, supra note 13, at 1232-54;
McDonald, supra note 10, at 341-48; Simon, supra note 8, at 192-201; and infra text ac-
companying notes 38-122.
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-19, at 952 (2d ed.
1988); see also id. § 12-18, at 943-44 (noting that if "one parses first amendment doc-
trine too finely, one may discover that little protection for expression remains").
16 Hudson, supra note 14, at 60; see also David L. Hudson,Jr., "Secondary Effects Doc-
trine" is Fertile Ground for Abuse, N.J. L.J., Mar. 24, 1997, at 23 (describing how courts
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on First Amendment jurisprudence. Nevertheless, this doctrine has
cut an ever-widening swath across First Amendment freedoms.
This doctrinal debate reached an ideological breaking point in
the Court's important but hopelessly splintered 1991 decision in
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., where a battle-worn plurality answered the
threshold question of whether nude dancing constituted expressive
conduct in the affirmative." A decade of confusion followed as courts
tried to cull from Barnes a cohesive framework for examining the con-
stitutionality of laws that had the effect of restricting adult expres-
sion. 8 In 2000, the Court seized an opportunity to revisit and clarify
this clouded doctrine when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court over-
turned a City of Erie general nudity ordinance on the grounds that it
unconstitutionally restricted free expression rights of nude dancing
entertainers.19
Instead of taking the opportunity to pull back from its heavily
criticized prior decisions, in City of Erie v. Pap's the Court actually ex-
tended the secondary effects doctrine beyond the pale of precedent,
with dangerous implications for increased prohibition of protected
expression. In doing so, the Court misread existing precedent and
misapplied First Amendment analysis both by entrenching a view of
nonobscene expression as low-value speech and by adhering to the
nonobvious conclusion that general laws that target specific adult ex-
pression merit only lower-level scrutiny reserved for content-neutral
laws. Furthermore, the Court's decision in City of Erie v. Pap's has un-
leashed a dangerously deferential secondary effects justification that
may threaten a wider array of protected speech. In effect, the Pap's
Court has built, stoked, and released a runaway steam engine in the
guise of the secondary effects doctrine and has virtually lashed adult-
oriented expression to the tracks a few miles down the line. This
Comment argues that the doctrine expounded in City of Erie v. Pap's
must be both restrained and reevaluated before municipalities use
Pap's to exert increasing power to further suppress controversial ex-
pression.
Part I of this Comment provides background on the 2000 Pennsyl-
pass zoning laws against adult businesses without ever citing harmful secondary ef-
fects).
17 See 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (showing no five Justice agreement on rationale); see
a/soYoung v. Am. Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1986) (same).
is See, e.g., Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie, 719 A.2d 273, 277-79 (Pa. 1998) (attempting
to divine a controlling rationale from Barnes).
19 Id. at 281.
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vania Supreme Court Pap's v. City of Erie case. Part II provides a de-
tailed explication of the evolution of adult entertainment doctrine.
First, I briefly examine the obscene/nonobscene distinction in the af-
termath of the landmark 1973 obscenity case of Miller v. California.
2
0 I
describe the prevailing content discrimination analysis used to exam-
ine laws under the First Amendment. I then provide a thorough de-
scription of the application of the content discrimination analytical
framework in adult entertainment cases and the development of the
secondary effects doctrine through Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. Part
III discusses the application of those precedents and principles by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Pap's and offers an analysis of the decision's
most important points. In Part IV, I offer my analysis of the dangers
of the Pap's decision. Finally, in Part V, I recommend changes the
Court should consider in the application of First Amendment adult
expression doctrine. A brief Conclusion follows.
I. SETTING THE SCENE: PAP'S A.M. v. CITY OFERJE
In September of 1994, the Erie, Pennsylvania, City Council en-
acted City of Erie Ordinance 75-1994, making it a summary offense to
knowingly or intentionally appear in public in a state of nudity.
2 To
20 413 U.S. 24 (1973)
21 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
2 Ordinance 75-1994, codified as Article 711 of the Codified Ordinances of the
City of Erie, provides in relevant part:
1. A person who knowingly or intentionally, in a public place:
a. engages in sexual intercourse
b. engages in deviate sexual intercourse as defined by the Pennsylvania
Crimes Code
c. appears in a state of nudity, or
d. fondles the genitals of himself, herself, or another person commits a
Public Indecency, a Summary Offense.
2. "Nudity" means the showing of the human male or female genital [sic], pu-
bic hair or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering; the showing of
the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the
nipple; the exposure of any device, costume, or covering which gives the
appearance of or simulates the genitals, pubic hair, natal cleft, perineum
anal region or pubic hair region; or the exposure of any device worn as a
cover over the nipples and/or areola of the female breast, which device
simulates and gives the realistic appearance of nipples and/or areola.
3. "Public Place" includes all outdoor places owned by or open to the general
public, and all buildings and enclosed places owned by or open to the gen-
eral public, including such places of entertainment, taverns, restaurants,
clubs, theaters, dance halls, banquet halls, party rooms or halls limited to
specific members, restricted to adults or to patrons invited to attend,
whether or not an admissions charge is levied
10272002]
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comply with this ordinance, a female over the age of ten would have
to wear at least what are colloquially known as "pasties" and a "G-
string."
Pap's A.M. ("Pap's") operated a totally nude dancing establish-
ment in Erie known as "Kandyland." Shortly after the ordinance be-
came effective, Pap's filed a complaint in equity against the City of
Erie, the Mayor, and the City Council seeking a declaratory judgment
that the ordinance was unconstitutional and requesting permanent
injunctive relief.23 In January of 1995, the Court of Common Pleas of
Erie County struck down the ordinance as unconstitutionally over-
broad." On cross-appeals, the Commonwealth Court-citing Justice
Souter's concurrence in Barnes as binding precedent 2 5-reversed the
trial court's order on two grounds: that the holding of unconstitu-
tional overbreadth was in error and that the ordinance did not in-
fringe impermissibly on Pap's right to freedom of expression.
26
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review on both grounds
and held the ordinance violated the free expresion rights of Pap's un-
der the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 7
At the outset, the court held that nude dancing is expressive conduct
and is entitled to "some quantum of protection under the First
Amendment."2 8 The court next examined whether the governmental
interest in enacting the ordinance was content-based or content-
4. The prohibition set forth in subsection I (c) shall not apply to:
a. Any child under ten (10) years of age; or
b. Any individual exposing a breast in the process of breastfeeding an infant
under two (2) years of age.
See also Pap's, 529 U.S. at 283-84 (reprinting ordinance); 719 A.2d 273, 275 n.2 (same).
23 Pap's, 529 U.S. at 284; 719 A.2d at 276.
24 Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie, 23 Pa. D. & C. 4th 337 (Ct. Com. P1. Erie County 1995).
25 Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie, 674 A.2d 338, 343 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996); Barnes, 501
U.S. at 581-87 (SouterJ., concurring).
26 Pap's, 674 A.2d 338, 343, 346 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996); 719 A.2d at 281.
27 Pap's, 719 A.2d at 281; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no
law.., abridging the freedom of speech...."); id. amend. XIV ("No state shall...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...."). The
First Amendment is made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963)
("It has long been established that these First Amendment freedoms are protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment."). For a detailed examination of the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court's Pap's decision, see McBride, supra note 14, at 299-309.
28 Pap's, 719 A.2d at 276 (citing Barnes, 501 U.S. at 565-66); see 529 U.S. at 285
(quoting the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noting that "nude dancing is expressive
conduct that is entitled to some quantum of protection under the First Amendment").
See also Barnes, in which eight of the Justices held that nude dancing was expression
entitled to Constitutional protection.
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neutral. After asserting that no clear precedent arises out of Barnes'
"'splintered and.., non-harmonious opinions,'-2 9 the court con-
ducted an independent examination of the ordinance and concluded
that it was content-based and deserving of strict scrutiny.
m Although
the court conceded that one of the purposes behind the ordinance
was to combat negative secondary effects, it found an "unmentioned
purpose" that was "inextricably bound up with [the] stated pur-
pose"-that of impacting negatively on the erotic message of nude
dancing. Specifically, the court agreed with Justice White's dissent in
Barnes, noting that "[i]t is only because nude dancing performances
may generate emotions and feelings of eroticism and sensuality
among the spectators that the State seeks to regulate such expressive
activity.
32
After applying strict scrutiny, the court found that the ordinance
failed the narrow tailoring requirement3 and severed the public nu-
dity provisions after finding them violative of the First Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution. 34 This holding obviated the need to decide the
question of overbreadth. Two justices concurred in the decision but
noted that-although they would have sustained the ordinance under
the U.S. Constitution because of its similarity to the ordinance upheld
in Barnes-they would have invalidated it under the Pennsylvania Con-.• 35
stitution.
Pap's, 529 U.S. at 285 (quoting Pap's, 719 A.2d at 277).
30 Pap's, 719 A.2d at 278-80.
3I ld. at 276. The Court drew much of this language from Justice White's dissent
in Barnes. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 592-93 (" [T]he emotional or erotic impact of the
dance is intensified by the nudity of the performers .... [and t]he nudity element of
nude dancing performances cannot be neatly pigeonholed as mere 'conduct' inde-
pendent of any expressive component of the dance.").
32 Pap's, 719 A.2d at 283-84 (citing Barnes, 501 U.S. at 592 (White, J., dissenting));
see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) ("Because the display clause regulates
speech due to its potential primary impact, we conclude it must be considered content-
based.").
33 The Court suggested that less restrictive methods such as time, place, or man-
ner restrictions would achieve the government's interest in preventing harmful secon-
dary effects. Pap's, 719 A.2d at 280 (citing Barnes, 501 U.S. at 594 (White, J., dissent-
ing)); see also McBride, supra note 14, at 308 n.116 (citing Ron Kalyan, Note, Regulation
of Nude Dancing in Bring Your Own Bottle Establishments in the Commonwealth of Pennsylva-
nia: Are the Commonwealth's Municipalities Left to Fend for Themselves , 99 DICK. L. REV.
169, 181 (1994)) (observing that municipalities can utilize regulations such as control
of location of clubs and restrictions on hours of operation to reduce conflicts with
residents and reduce crime).
34 Pap's, 529 U.S. at 286; 719 A.2d at 281.
35 Pap's, 529 U.S. at 286; 719 A.2d at 281-84 (Castille,J., concurring); McBride, su-
pra note 14, at 302. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 7, which states that "[t]he free communi-
10292002]
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The City of Erie petitioned for a writ of certiorari,36 and the U.S.
Supreme Court decided the case, now captioned City of Erie v. Pap's
A.M., on March 29, 2000. The plurality upheld a restrictive general
law, applying a secondary effects rationale . I shall return to this deci-
sion after setting the doctrinal scene.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF NUDE DANCING DOCTRINE
A. The Limitations ofMiller and Nude Dancing
as Protected Expressive Conduct
The Supreme Court set forth the modern obscenity test in Miller
v. California.8 Miller conducted a mass mailing campaign to advertise
the sale of illustrated books. His brochures contained pictures of
sexually explicit activities and were mailed to individuals who had not
requested them. Miller was convicted of violating California law by
knowingly distributing obscene matter.39 In vacating Miller's convic-
cation of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man." Michael
McBride argues that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court "invited a needless reversal of
[its] decision" by deciding the case under the U.S. Constitution and could have instead
"clearly defined the ability of local governments to regulate nude dancing in [its]
Commonwealth" by following the suggestion of the concurrence to decide the case
under the Pennsylvania Constitution. McBride, supra note 14, at 302-03. He suggests
the court should have acknowledged Barnes as binding precedent and decided the case
on independent state grounds. Id. at 305. Other courts have chosen this path, see, for
example, 7250 Corp. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 799 P.2d 917 (Colo. 1990); O'Day v.
King County, 749 P.2d 142 (Wash. 1988). Indeed, in his subsequent concurring opin-
ion in Pap's, Justice Souter specifically suggested the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was
not barred "from choosing simpler routes to disposition of the case" under either a
federal overbreadth challenge or a Pennsylvania constitutional challenge. Pap's, 529
U.S. at 317 n.6 (SouterJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Pennsyl-
vania v. Campana, 314 A.2d 854, 855-56 (1974) (holding that after reversal by the U.S.
Supreme Court on a federal issue, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court can reaffirm its
decision on state constitutional grounds). McBride discusses the precedents for an
independent state constitutional ruling at length in his article. McBride, supra note 14,
at 305 n.105.
36 Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie, 719 A.2d 273 (Pa. 1998), cert. granted, 526 U.S. 1111
(May 17, 1999) (No. 98-1161).
See Pap's, 529 U.S. at 296, 302 (upholding city ban against public nudity on the
basis that the goal of the regulation is the prevention of harmful secondary effects that
are unrelated to the suppression of free expression).
38 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). For a survey of the development of obscenity doctrine
prior to Miller, see THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 467-
515 (1970). The Miller test supplanted the "utterly without redeeming social impor-
tance" obscenity standard set forth in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957).
39 Miller, 413 U.S. at 16-18. The brochures Miller sent advertised four graphic
books entitled Intercourse, Man-Woman, Sex Orgies Illustrated, and An Illustrated History of
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tion, the Court developed the three-prong Miller test-whether a work
is obscene is determined by:
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, po-
litical, or scientific value. °
However, the Court intended for this test to label only graphic,
"hard-core" pornography as obscene,4' as reflected in the Court's re-
versal of an obscenity conviction for a showing of the film Carnal
Knowledge in Jenkins v. Georgia.42 At the same time, the Court expanded
its recognition of First Amendment protections for a variety of forms
of entertainment.4 As a result, only a small portion of pornographic
materials could be restricted under Miller's strict reading of obscenity
law.
Eventually (if somewhat reluctantly), the Court recognized explic-
itly that nude dancing was entitled to some level of First Amendment
protection. In California v. LaRue, the Court first acknowledged that
nude dancing might be entitled to First and Fourteenth Amendment
protection under some circumstances.44 Nine years later the Court
suggested in Schad v. Mt. Ephraim that "nude dancing is not without its
Pornography. They contained explicit drawings and pictures of groups of two or more
people engaging in explicit sexual activities, with genitals often showing. Id. at 18.
40 Id. at 24-25.
41 See Miler, 413 U.S. at 27 ("Under the holdings announced today, no one will be
subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these mate-
rials depict or describe patently offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct specifically de-
fined by the regulating state law .... ); Simon, supra note 8, at 193 ("The Court has
used the Miller test to deny First Amendment protection only to the most sexually ex-
plicit and hard-core pornography.").
42 SeeJenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974) ("We hold that the film could
not, as a matter of constitutional law, be found to depict sexual conduct in a patently
offensive way, and that it is therefore not outside the protection of the First and Four-
teenth Amendments because it is obscene.").
43 McBride, supra note 14, at 291 n.19; Servodidio, supra note 13, at 1234-35; see
also Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (establishing protection for
broadcasting); Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 161 (protection for film); Sable Communications of
Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (protection for dial-a-porn messages). See generally
Bruce A. Taylor, Hard-Core Pornography: A Proposal for a Per Se Rule, 21 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 255 (1987-88) (providing a history of the Supreme Court's obscenity jurispru-
dence and detailing its shortcomings).
4 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972).
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First Amendment protections from official regulation."45 Finally, in
Barnes, eight Justices agreed that nude dancing is expressive conduct
46whose regulation requires First Amendment analysis.
B. Content Discrimination Analysis
To best understand the evolution of this doctrine and its distor-
tion in City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., it is helpful to be familiar with the
content-based/content-neutral distinction, the "primary doctrinal tool
employed by the Supreme Court" in First Amendment analysis. 47 The
Court most often applies a "motivational" or "government purpose"
inquiry to determine whether a law was passed because the govern-
ment disagreed with a particular message, as well as to gauge what
level of scrutiny should be applied to the regulation. 8
Briefly, content-based laws restrict expression based on the spe-
cific message conveyed; 49 these can include laws that restrict a specific
45 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981).
46 See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991) (describing nude danc-
ing as "within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though... only margin-
ally so"); id. at 581 (Souter,J., concurring) ("[W]hen nudity is combined with expres-
sive activity, its stimulative and attractive value certainly can enhance the force of
expression.... [An interest in freely engaging in the nude dancing at issue here is
subject to a degree of First Amendment protection."); id. at 587-88 n.1 (White, J., dis-
senting) (noting that dancing "[i]nherently... is the communication of emotion or
ideas"). Only Justice Scalia argued that nude dancing did not deserve First Amend-
ment protection: "It cannot reasonably be demanded, therefore, that every restriction
of expression incidentally produced by a general law regulating conduct pass normal
First Amendment scrutiny .. " Id. at 576.
47 Hudson, supra note 14, at 57; see also Marc Rohr, Freedom of Speech After Justice
Brennan, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 413, 449-50 (1993) (concluding that the decade
of the 1980s, where the Supreme Court consistently distinguished between content-
based and content-neutral regulations, "produced the crystallization of First Amend-
ment law"). For a thorough general discussion of content discrimination analysis, see
Hudson, supra note 14, at 57-59; Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U.
CHI. L. REv. 46 (1987) [hereinafter Stone, Content-Neutral]; Geoffrey R. Stone, Content
Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983) [hereinafter
Stone, Content Regulation]; Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First
Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615 (1991).
48 Hudson, supra note 14, at 58-59; see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 791 (1989) ("The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality.., is
whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement
with the message it conveys. The government's purpose is the controlling considera-
tion." (citation omitted)).
49 Hudson, supra note 14, at 58 n.13 ("'As a general rule, laws that by their terms
distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views
expressed are content-based."' (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,
643 (1994)).
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subject matter on their face (e.g., banning the publishing of a maga-
zine on the subject of guns) and laws that narrowly proscribe a par-
ticular viewpoint (e.g., banning pro-gun control magazines).50 Prior
to Renton v. Playtime Theatres, content-based statutes always received
strict scrutiny, even if they only restricted the time, place, or manner
51
of expression.
In contrast, content-neutral laws are not intended on their face to
suppress a message, although they may have inadvertent restrictive ef-
fects on expression.5 2 The two most common forms of content-neutral
laws are time, place, or manner restrictions and incidental regulations
of symbolic speech.53 Importantly, the Supreme Court originally es-
tablished different tests for these two types of content-neutral regula-
tions.
1. Time, Place, or Manner Regulation Test
A time, place, or manner restriction ("TPM")-which by defini-
tion is not a total ban-is content-neutral if it meets three criteria.
First, the government must have a substantial interest in the regula-
tion that is unrelated to the suppression of ideas; second, the means
must be narrowly tailored to the goal of the regulation; and finally,
reasonable alternative avenues of expression must be left open.
54 The
tailoring requirement means that the regulation must merely "pro-
mote[] a substantial government interest that would be achieved less
effectively absent regulation"-not that it be the "least restrictive
means" available.55 Furthermore, the TPM test requires that reason-
able alternative avenues be made available for expression that is due
50 Note, The Content Distinction in Free Speech Analysis After Renton, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1904, 1906-07 (1989) [hereinafter Free Speech Analysis].
51 See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (applying strict
scrutiny and striking down an ordinance banning movies containing nudity from out-
door drive-in movie theaters); Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101-02
(1972) (applying strict scrutiny and striking down an ordinance banning picketing
near schools).
52 Hudson, supra note 14, at 60.
53 See generally Stone, Content-Neutra supra note 47; Stone, Content Regulation, supra
note 47.
54 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771
(1976); see also Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 217 (holding that the means employed by a city
ordinance banning films containing nudity from drive-in theaters are overbroad with
respect to the legitimate interests asserted as the goals of the regulation); Williams, su-
pra note 47, at 642 n. 118 (collecting cases).
55 Williams, supra note 47, at 643-44 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 799 (1989)).
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some sort of First Amendment protection.
2. Incidental Burden/Symbolic Speech Test
Symbolic speech occurs when the expressive element of commu-
nication is conveyed through non-verbal speech (action), and the
"speech" and "non-speech" elements are combined in the same ex-
pressive action:. In order to qualify as speech, the conduct must be
intended to be communicative and the message conveyed must be
reasonably understood by the viewerY In United States v. O'Brien, the
Supreme Court created a four-part test for content-neutral laws that
create an incidental burden on symbolic speech. In O'Brien, the Court
reviewed the conviction of a man for burning his draft card in viola-
tion of federal law. An "incidental" restriction is allowed under
O'Brien if (1) the regulation is within the constitutional power of the
government; (2) the regulation furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; (3) the governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression; and (4) the incidental restrictions
on First Amendment freedoms are no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest. 8 Furthermore, the Court clarified in
Grayned v. City of Rockford that, in determining reasonableness under
the fourth prong, "[t]he crucial question is whether the manner of
expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a par-
ticular place at a particular time.
5
1
3. Collapse of the Two Standards
While the tests may appear similar at first glance, they are distinct
in several ways. First, the Court created the O'Brien test in the face of
the preexisting TPM test-signaling an intention to create a distinct
standard. 0 Second, the TPM test's tailoring requirement is substan-
tially weaker than the parallel requirement in the O'Brien test-it does
not require that the restriction be "no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of [the governmental] interest. ,61 Third, the TPM test
requires consideration of "alternative avenues of speech," a prong
56 Id. at 644; Simon, supra note 8, at 196.
57 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404, 406 (1989).
58 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
59 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
60 See Williams, supra note 47, at 648-50 (explaining the different origins of the two
doctrinal tests).
61 Id. at 648 (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
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framework.67 The Court first faced the question of whether a city may
use zoning regulations to single out adult-oriented businesses in Young
v. American Mini Theatres.68
The regulation at issue in American Mini Theatres required that an
adult-oriented business 9 could not be located within one thousand
feet of any two other "regulated uses" (ten types of establishments, in-
cluding adult theaters) or within five hundred feet of any area zoned
for residential use.7° The ordinance itself did not distinguish between
establishments presenting "obscene" material and those presenting
"non-obscene" pornographic material under Miller. The Supreme
Court, in upholding the regulation, admitted that the law-both fa-
cially and in its operation-deliberately placed a burden on a type of
expression specifically because of its content.
71
Despite this reality, the Court declined to apply the strict scrutiny
normally required for content-based regulations and instead applied
the lower standard of scrutiny pegged to content-neutral regulations. 2
The Court accepted the City of Detroit's argument that the goal of the
ordinance was not to target any particular subject matter because of
the subject matter itself, but rather was to prevent the deterioration of
67 For a detailed account of such efforts and reaction by the lower federal courts,
see id., discussing local governments' uses of TPM restrictions; Simon, supra note 8, at
197-99, discussing the Supreme Court's application of TPM restrictions, particularly
the requirement that content neutrality be aimed at negative secondary effects.
68 427 U.S. 50 (1976). For general discussion of this case, see also Maimer, supra
note 12, at 1296-97, which generally discusses Young and notes that the court's holding
relied on the fact that the statute was content-neutral and that erotic material, al-
though protected under the First Amendment, receives a lesser degree of protection;
Francesca Ortiz, Zoning the Voyeur Dorm: Regulating Home-Based Voyeur Websites Through
Land Use Laws, 34 U.C. DAVis L. REv. 929, 958-60 (2001), which discusses Young and its
holding that the statute in question was permissible as being viewpoint neutral and
that the rights at stake regarding sexual speech were deserving of a lower degree of
First Amendment protection; Williams, supra note 47, at 629-32, which generally dis-
cusses Young and uses it as an example of the fact that the Supreme Court does not
apply the content discrimination principle broadly; McDonald, supra note 10, at 343-
46, which discusses the application of TPM restrictions in Young and determines that
local governments relying on such restrictions will ultimately have to demonstrate the
negative secondary effects adult entertainment has on the community in order to pre-
vail; Simon, supra note 8, at 197-98, which discusses Young and its holding that zoning
restrictions are permissible when viewpoint neutral.
69 Here this term encompassed adult bookstores and motion picture theaters.
American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 53 n.5.
70 Id. at 52.
71 Id. at 63.
72 Williams, supra note 47, at 629; see Servodidio, supra note 13, at 1238 (noting
thatJustice Stevens declined to apply strict scrutiny and holding that a lesser scrutiny is
appropriate "on the basis of its content as long as it does not violate... 'neutrality."').
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completely absent from the O'Brien analysis.2
Despite this segregated development, the Supreme Court has con-
fusingly but effectively collapsed these two tests into a single, lenient
test.63 In Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, the Court explic-
itly stated that there was "little, if any" difference between the TPM
test and the O'Brien test and sustained an incidental burden regulation
under a loose, combined standard.6 The Court saw fit to justify this
metamorphosis:
[I]f the time, place, or manner restriction on expressive sleep-
ing. . . sufficiently and narrowly serves a substantial enough governmen-
tal interest to escape First Amendment condemnation, it is untenable to
invalidate it under O'Brien on the ground that the governmental interest
is insufficient to warrant the intrusion on First Amendment concerns or
that there is an inadequate nexus between the regulation and the inter-
65
est sought to be served.
Until Pap's, no dissenters drew attention to this doctrinal collapse.
C. Application of the Content Discrimination Framework
and Development of Secondaty Effects Doctrine
1. Doctrinal Shift in Young v. American Mini Theatres
Soon after it became clear that the Miller test would not support
bans of nonobscene adult entertainment, local governments began to
6
use time, place, or manner zoning restrictions to restrict adult enter-
tainment establishments, and they sought to justify such laws as con-
tent-neutral within the Court's content discrimination analytical
62 Id.
63 Id. at 650-55 (detailing "the collapse of the two lines of doctrine"); see, e.g.,
Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804-17 (1984)
(applying the O'Brien standard to a classic TPM regulation); see also David S. Day, The
Hybridization of the Content-Neutral Standards for the Free Speech Clause, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
195, 211-27 (1987) (discussing the hybridization of the two tests and whether or not
such a step was warranted).
64 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984).
65 Id. at 298 n.8; see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796-800 (1989)
(noting that the Court in Clark held O'Brien to apply standards no different from those
applied to TPM restrictions and reaffirming that holding).
66 For a description of other means that local governments have used to restrict
adult-oriented businesses, including alcohol restrictions and licensing, see Malmer,
supra note 12, at 1281-304 (discussing cases in which local governments have at-
tempted to limit adult entertainment through alcohol restrictions pursuant to regula-
tory powers conferred by the Twenty-First Amendment, TPM restrictions, and licensing
restrictions).
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urban neighborhoods caused by the aggregation of adult-oriented
73 ,74businesses. These "secondary effects, the Court held, were not re-
lated to the suppression of expression.
Scholar David Hudson suggests that the Court neatly "substituted
'viewpoint-neutrality' for 'content-neutrality' 7 by concluding that the
regulation met constitutional muster "because it [did] not restrict a
certain "'social, political, or philosophical message' or 'point of
view. Furthermore, the plurality supported the application of con-
tent-neutral analysis by asserting that nonobscene pornographic
speech was of low value: "[S] ociety's interest in protecting this type of
expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the in-
terest in untrammeled political debate .... , In a sharp dissent, Jus-
tice Stewart characterized this shift as an "aberration" that was "a dras-
tic departure from established principles of First Amendment law.",
7
2. Development of Secondary Effects Doctrine
Through City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres
After holding prevention of harmful secondary effects-"non-
communicative effects arising from the speech as a physical event in
the world, not from the communicative aspect of the speech" 7 -to be
a valid government intention, the Court reaffirmed its permissive
purposive analysis in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres.8 ° As Susan Wil-
73 American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 54-55.
74 See id. at 71 n.34 (Stevens, J.) (noting that the ordinance is intended to avoid
secondary effects, such as deterioration and crime, that accompany the establishment
of adult theaters).
75 Hudson, supra note 14, at 62 (quoting American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 70).
76 Id. at 62 (citing Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 804 (1984)); see also Malmer, supra note 12, at 1296-97 ("The majority also stressed
that although the ordinance was not content neutral, it was viewpoint neutral.").
77 American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 70 (emphasis added); see also Larry Alexan-
der, Low Value Speech, 83 Nw. U.L. REv. 547 (1989) (advancing the theory that the
Court has deliberately created a brand of "low-value" speech entitled to less constitu-
tional protection).
78 American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 84, 87 (StewartJ., dissenting).
79 Williams, supra note 47, at 630.
80 See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 46 (1986) (stating the re-
sult was "largely dictated by our decision in Young v. American Mini Theatres"). For a
detailed analysis of Renton, see Servodidio, supra note 13, at 1238-41, which discusses
Renton generally and notes its reliance on Young in permitting TPM restrictions that
are content-neutral, but then changes the analysis of content neutrality to focus on
secondary effects; Free Speech Analysis, supra note 50, at 1907-12; Ortiz, supra note 68, at
960-61, which discusses Renton and notes its holding that a statute can be permissible as
content-neutral if its purpose is to prevent undesirable secondary effects.
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liams concludes, "[a]fter Renton, it was clear that the Court had
adopted the secondary effects analysis and its underlying purposive
theory of content discrimination.
"81
The ordinance at issue prohibited any "adult motion picture thea-
ters from locating within [one thousand] feet of any residential zone,
single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school," but did
not regulate any other types of adult-oriented businesses.s2 The Ameri-
can Mini Theatres plurality had concluded that the Detroit ordinance
in question was content-based, but nevertheless was entitled to less
scrutiny based on the low value of the speech and secondary effects.
The Renton Court advanced that proposition two dramatic steps fur-
83ther in holding the Renton ordinance to be constitutional .
First, the Court-while admitting the law facially discriminated
against adult theaters84 -held for the first time that such an ordinance
was content-neutral: "[T]he Renton ordinance is completely consis-
tent with our definition of 'content-neutral' speech regulations as
those that 'are justified without reference to the content of the regu-
lated speech.' 8 5 As such, the plurality invoked the TPM test and held
that the ordinance both satisfied a substantial government interest
and did not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communica-
86tion. The vehicle the Court rode to this destination was the now
fully-enunciated secondary effects doctrine. The City of Renton had
claimed that its purpose in passing the ordinance was to combat sec-
ondary effects and to protect and preserve "the quality of its neigh-
81 Williams, supra note 47, at 632.
82 Renton, 475 U.S. at 43.
83 David Hudson notes that Renton has been sharply criticized by legal commenta-
tors. See Hudson, supra note 14, at 65-66 (noting that Renton has been criticized as sub-
stantially revising First Amendment doctrine and as taking a wholly unprecedented
approach to the understanding of content neutrality); see, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 15, at
§ 12-19, at 952 ("The Renton view should be quickly renounced. Carried to its logical
conclusion, such a doctrine could gravely erode the first amendment's protections.");
Rohr, supra note 47, at 452 ("[Renton is] a wholly unprecedented approach to the un-
derstanding of content-neutrality."); Free Speech Analysis, supra note 50, at 1908 ("Con-
strued expansively to encompass viewpoint-specific resolutions, Renton substantially re-
vises first amendment doctrine."); The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV.
100, 196 (1986) [hereinafter Leading Cases] ("This reasoning marks a startling break
with traditional First Amendmentjurisprudence.").
84 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 47 ("To be sure, the ordinance treats theaters that spe-
cialize in adult films differently from other kinds of theaters.").
85 Id. at 48 (quoting Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771 (1976)).
86Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 71-73 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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borhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of urban life. 87 For
the Renton majority, the ordinance was not aimed at adult theaters,
but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the surround-
ing community.
8
Second, as Gianni Servodidio cogently observes, Renton extended
the secondary effects doctrine beyond the scope of American Mini
Theatres in several ways.89 First, the Court ruled that the City of Renton
did not have to develop any specific, independent evidentiary basis to
support its secondary effects purpose claim. The Court held Renton
could simply use evidence already generated by other cities "so long as
[it] is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city
addresses."9° This profoundly lax standard allowed Renton-a city of
32,000 people that did not even have an adult theater when the ordi-
nance was passed9-to use evidence gathered in Seattle and Detroit as
evidence of Renton's need to combat secondary effects that did not
yet exist. Second, in a departure from American Mini Theatres, the
Court demonstrated a willingness to allow the secondary effects ra-
tionale to profoundly restrict the availability of alternative avenues of
92expression. The American Mini Theatres Court had relied in part on
the fact that the ordinance left "myriad locations"93 where theaters
could operate without violating the ordinance. The Renton ordi-
nance, in sharp contrast, left only a small area of virtually unusable
land open to use for adult theaters9-a difference the Court was will-
ing to ignore as mere conditions of the real estate market.95  The
Court was unwilling to consider the imposition of what could be
87 Renton, 475 U.S. at 58 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
See id. at 47 (approving the district court's characterization of the ordinance as
aimed not at the content of the films but at the secondary effects); see also Hudson, su-
pra note 14, at 64-66 (noting that the court, while relying on Young, expanded the doc-
trine to encompass the secondary effects on which it based its decision); Servodidio,
supra note 13, at 1240-42 ("[T]he City Council's actions were not justified on the basis
of the content of sexually explicit films but rather on the secondary effects adult thea-
tres would have on the surrounding community.").
89 Servodidio, supra note 13, at 1240-41.
90 Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52.
91 Id. at 44.
92 See Servodidio, supra note 13, at 1241-42 (noting that Renton, by allowing an or-
dinance that substantially limited the amount of real estate available, thereby restricted
alternate avenues of expression).
93 Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 71-72 n.35 (1976).
94 Renton, 475 U.S. at 53-54.
95 See id. at 54 (stating that "respondents must fend for themselves in the real es-
tate market, on an equal footing with other prospective purchasers and lessees").
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termed a "major competitive disadvantage" on adult theater owners asS 96
a compelling argument for strict scrutiny. These remarkable secon-
dary effects extensions directly precipitated Barnes.97
3. Splintered Entrenchment of Lower Level Scrutiny
in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.
The U.S. Supreme Court heard Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. after an
en banc Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held an Indiana
public indecency statute to be an unconstitutional restriction on ex-
pressive nude dancing.9s While the ordinances at issue in American
Mini Theatres and Renton were zoning laws (location restrictions im-
posed on businesses), the Indiana statute at issue in Barnes banned all
nudity in public and thus involved a direct restriction on nude danc-
ing itself." The law could only be satisfied if dancers wore pasties and
a G-string 00
96 Servodidio, supra note 13, at 1241; see Simon, supra note 8, at 201 ("Despite the
Court's refusal to disturb the trial court's finding that other land was available to estab-
lish an adult business, it may have in fact created 'a major competitive disadvan-
tage'. (citations omitted)).
Laurence Tribe feared this result when, after Renton, he suggested that the sec-
ondary effects doctrine could "gravely erode the first amendment's protections" and
subject "most, if not all" speech to regulation. TRIBE, supra note 15, at § 12-19, at 952;
see also Leading Cases, supra note 83, at 200 ("[Renton] has opened the door to restric-
tions of all speech on the basis of contrived secondary effects.").
98 See Miller v. South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1088 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Indiana's at-
tempt to ban nude dancing in pursuit of its aforementioned interest is a forbidden in-
terference and restraint because it seeks to withdraw this non-obscene and protected
communication from the realm of public discourse."), rev'd, Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991). For a careful analysis of the vivid dialogue between Judges
Posner and Easterbrook in this case, see Blasi, supra note 13, at 625-39.
99 See Hudson, supra note 14, at 67-68 ("While American Mini Theatres and Renton
involved the concentration or dispersal of adult businesses, 'the essence of zoning,'
Barnes involved a direct restriction on the nature of exotic dancing .. " (citation
omitted))
100 The Indiana Code provided in relevant part:
(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally, in a public place:
1. engages in sexual intercourse;
2. engages in deviate sexual conduct;
3. appears in a state of nudity; or
4.fondles the genitals of himself or another person; commits public
indecency, a Class A misdemeanor.
(b) 'Nudity' means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic
area, or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the
nipple, or the showing of covered male genitals in a discernably turgid
state.
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-4-1 (1988) (current version codified with some differences in
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Although the Court's decision was fractured and no more than
three Justices agreed on any one rationale,"" eight of the nine Justices
answered the threshold question of whether nude dancing constituted
expressive conduct in the affirmative. The plurality opinion came to
this conclusion reluctantly, admitting it was protected, but "only mar-
ginally so."0 2 The plurality then proceeded to characterize nude
dancing as symbolic speech deserving of analysis under the O'Brien
test. 0 3 This was a marked departure from precedent.
0 4
To accomplish this shift, the plurality had to ignore cases such as
Schad, American Mini Theatres, and Renton, which recognized the inher-
ent expressive quality of adult entertainment. The plurality declined
to apply the TPM analysis requested by Indiana,0 5 concluding that it
was developed for "evaluating restrictions on expression taking place
on public property which had been dedicated as a 'public forum.
10 6
The Court then disposed of the Renton precedent by noting that "al-
though we have on at least one occasion applied it to conduct occur-
ring on private property," the two tests "embody much the same stan-
dards" anyway. °7 As commentator Timothy Tesluk shrewdly suggests,
"[b]y giving no reason for its departure from settled precedent in the
classification of dancing, the Barnes plurality legitimized an exclusive
language at IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-4-1 (1998)), quoted in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,
501 U.S. 560, 569 n.2 (1991).
101 In fact, two concurring Justices "went out of their way to avoid having to en-
dorse Chief Justice Rehnquist's [plurality opinion]." Blasi, supra note 13, at 639; see
also Barnes, 501 U.S. at 572-81 (Scalia, J., concurring) (upholding the regulation not
because it survives a lower level of First Amendment scrutiny, but because regulating
conduct not specifically directed at expression is not generally subject to First
Amendment scrutiny); id. at 581-87 (Souter,J., concurring) (agreeing with the plural-
ity's application of the O'Brien test and noting that the activity in question is subject to
some degree of First Amendment protection, but writing separately to express his view
that the case should be decided principally on the state's interest in "combating the
secondary effects of adult entertainment").
102 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 565-66. For a detailed examination of Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion, see Blasi, supra note 13, at 639-44, which examines Rehnquist's
enthusiastic approval of the enforcement of morality as a justification for regulating
speech.
103 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566-68. But see id. at 596 (White, J., dissenting) ("[The plu-
rality and Justice Scalia] would eviscerate the O'Brien test."). For a detailed discussion
of Justice White's dissent, see Blasi, supra note 13, at 655-61, which examines Justice
White's skepticism toward legal claims of a symbolic and unspecific character.
104 See, e.g., Renton, 475 U.S. at 41 (applying a TPM analysis to an ordinance regu-
latinA the zoning of adult theaters).
Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566.
:or Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
07 Id.
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focus on conduct, and not communication, in the crucial first step of
First Amendment analysis speech classification."'08 , The Court then
applied the "legislature-friendly" 10 9 O'Brien test, which, importantly,
does not require the adequate alternative channels of communication
requirement of the TPM test-in effect leaving open the possibility of
a total ban on some expressive conduct.
The majority's splintered rationales are reflected keenly in their
O'Brien analyses. The plurality concluded that the substantial gov-
ernment interest required by O'Brien was the interest in "protecting
societal order and morality,""0 buoyed by a lengthy Indiana common
law history of prohibiting indecency. In doing so, the plurality relied
on several cases unrelated to First Amendment-protected conduct,"'
and admitted that it was impossible to actually know what the legisla-
ture intended because Indiana does not record legislative 
history." 2
The plurality then concluded that the law was "unrelated to the sup-
pression of expression" because it was a general law aimed at all nu-
dity.'
13
Justice Souter's concurrence opened another permissive door to
108 Tesluk, supra note 10, at 1111. Tesluk argues that this approach "substitutes
assertion for proof and avoids the core question concerning any alleged First Amend-
ment activity: does the activity involve communication?" and suggests that by focusing
their argument in this way, the plurality encouraged "courts to 'categorize an appar-
ently limitless variety' of speech as conduct, thereby leading to 'reduced' or non-
existent First Amendment protection." Id.; see also Barnes, 501 U.S. at 567 ("[A] suffi-
ciently important governmental interest in regulating non-speech element[s] can jus-
tify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." (quoting United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1967))).
109 Tesluk, supra note 10, at 1112.
110 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 568.
I Id. at 569 (citing Paris Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), and Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
112 Id. at 567-68.
13 See id. at 570-71 ("[The law] does not deprive the dance of whatever erotic mes-
sage it conveys; it simply makes the message slightly less graphic. The perceived evil
that Indiana seeks to address is not erotic dancing, but public nudity."). Gianni Ser-
vodidio argues that "the breaking down of conduct into its component parts" used ef-
fectively in O'Brien proves problematic in application to the expression in Barnes. Ser-
vodidio, supra note 13, at 1250-51. In O'Brien, the case clearly involved speech and
nonspeech elements, and O'Brien's conviction was based on the non-communicative
aspect of his conduct. In Barnes, however, the conduct in question had been previously
held by the Supreme Court to have inherently expressive attributes. See id. at 1250
(discussing the plurality's demonstrated "discomfort with its earlier holding regarding
the Constitutionality of nude dance"). But see Barnes, 501 U.S. at 589-90 (White, J., dis-
senting) (taking issue with the characterization of the Indiana statute as a "general
law" since it does not apply to nudity in performances of theatrical productions, plays,
ballets, or operas).
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local governments. '1 4 Differing from the plurality's rationale, Justice
Souter's justification for the "substantial government interest" was the
deterrence of "pernicious secondary effects" (such as "prostitution,
sexual assault, and associated crimes") as advanced in Renton.
1 5 Since
the law was aimed directly at these secondary effects, and not the sup-
pression of expression, it survived Justice Souter's O'Brien analysis be-
cause he doubted whether there was a causal connection between "the
expression inherent in nude dancing" and the evils the State was seek-
ing to prevent.116 Most importantly, Souter determined that a local
government neednot "await localized proof of those effects" and that
Indiana could "reasonably conclude" there was a direct correlation
without knowing "what the precise causes of the correlation really
are."11 7 Therefore, Souter implicitly sanctioned the application of Ren-
ton's secondary effects justification for zoning TPM restrictions to satisfy
the potential total suppression of expression as an incidental effect of
a general law under O'Brien. ' Finally, Justice Scalia argued against ap-
plication of O'Brien at all: "It cannot reasonably be demanded, there-
fore, that every restriction of expression incidentally produced by a
114 For a detailed examination of Justice Souter's opinion, see Blasi, supra note 13,
at 649-55, which examines Souter's desire to search for limiting principles in the sec-
ondary effects doctrine.
Barnes, 501 U.S. at 584 (Souter, J., concurring) (relying on Renton v. Playtime
Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986)).
116 Id. at 585-86 (Souter, J., concurring). But see id. at 593 n.2 (White, J., dissent-
ing) ("IfJustice Souter is correct.., the State does not have even a rational basis for its
absolute prohibition on nude dancing that is admittedly expressive."); id. at 594
(White,J., dissenting) (asserting that if the State's interest was really in preventing evils
like prostitution, the State should adopt restrictions that do not interfere with the ex-
pressive nature of nonobscene nude dance instead of "[b]anning an entire category of
expressive activity").
117 Id. at 584-86 (SouterJ., concurring).
118 SeeTesluk, supra note 10, at 1119 ("Justice Souter would regard the experiences
and findings of any American municipality as presumptively valid in a deternination of
the non-causal link between a particular expressive activity and negative secondary ef-
fects."). Timothy Tesluk asserts that, under Souter's analysis, the government must
suppress the expressive performances that correlate with negative secondary effects as
opposed to being related to the expression (which would fail O'Brien's third prong)-a
rationally questionable distinction. Id. at 1120-21. Given the difficulty in differentiat-
ing between the two, Tesluk concludes that Justice Souter effectively gives a free pass
on the third prong. Id. at 1121 ("Under Justice Souter's correlation analysis, states are
essentially immune from an attack under the third prong of O'Brien because of the ex-
treme difficulty of determining whether a speech prohibition is related or merely 'cor-
related' to the suppression of free expression."). Vincent Blasi notes that Justice
Souter made no attempt to explain how the pasties and G-string requirement "could
be thought, even speculatively, to have any incremental impact on the secondary ef-
fects he had posited." Blasi, supra note 13, at 654.
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general law regulating conduct pass normal First Amendment scru-
tiny, or even... that it be justified by an 'important or substantial'
government interest."m
9
The outcome of the Barnes decision was swift and dramatic-it
"engendered an assault on the adult entertainment industry."020 Un-
questionably, it entrenched a lower level of scrutiny for restrictions on
adult entertainment. But it also left courts with no clear guidance as
to how best to justify restrictive general laws.12 ' Aside from advancing
three sharply different rationales, Barnes' result is confusing and in-
ternally contradictory: while the Court feels constrained by precedent
to admit that nude dancing is protected expression, it then "label[s]
nudity a noncommunicative component of some undefined whole.
1 22
Nine years later, the Court was asked to articulate a more cohesive de-
cisional framework in City of Erie v. Pap's A.M.
12 3
III. APPLICATION OF NUDE DANCING DOCTRINE
IN CITY OFERIE V. PAP'S A.M.
In upholding the constitutionality of the City of Erie ordinance
119 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 576-77 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia based his ar-
gument on the fact that the law at issue was a general law not specifically targeted at
expressive conduct, and that the "First Amendment explicitly protects 'the freedom of
speech [and] of the press'-oral and written speech-not 'expressive conduct."' Id. at
576. For a detailed examination ofJustice Scalia's opinion, see Blasi, supra note 13, at
644-49, which examines Scalia's rejection of the notion that nude dancing enjoys con-
stitutional protection.
120 Hudson, supra note 14, at 73. See, e.g., id. at 77-79 (highlighting twenty-seven
widely varied types of secondary effects used to justify restrictions on expression).
Barnes also spurred laws not related to adult entertainment. See Tesluk, supra note 10,
at 1122 (observing that, in the year following Barnes, only four of the thirteen decisions
citing Barnes have involved nude dancing performed as entertainment).
2 See Tesluk, supra note 10, at 1121-22 (suggesting seven ways Barnes weakened
and confused the right to free expression).
122 Servodidio, supra note 13, at 1254; see also id. at 1254 n.162 ("Attempts to de-
termine which element 'predominates' will therefore inevitably degenerate into ques-
tion-begging judgments about whether the activity should be protected." (quoting
John H. Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in
First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1482, 1495 (1975))). This conclusion is es-
pecially confusing given the Court's prior conclusion in Schad that "'nudity alone' does
not place otherwise protected material outside the mantle of the First Amendment."
Barnes, 501 U.S. at 592 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Schad v. Borough of Mount
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981)).
123 The Sixth Circuit demonstrated this need when it complained that following
Supreme Court precedent in this area was limited to "reading the tea leaves of Barnes."
Triplett Grille, Inc. v. City of Akron, 40 F.3d 129, 134 (6th Cir. 1994).
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outlawing public nudity,12 4 the Pap's Court took another dramatic step
toward applying low-level scrutiny and allowing municipalities to effec-
tively suppress nude dancing."' Critically, however, the Court once
again failed to achieve more than an embattled plurality to endorse its
revised rationale. 2 6 Justice Scalia's fifth-vote concurrence displayed
overt skepticism toward the plurality's reasoning,
2 7 while Justice
Souter-member of the Barnes majority and original architect of the
128
secondary effects doctrine now adopted by the plurality s--ques-
tioned a significant portion of his Barnes concurrence 
in dissent.2 9
Despite the Court's continued problems with mustering a convincing
majority, the plurality made several substantial strides in its opinion.
It emphatically strengthened the content-neutral analysis enunciated
in Barnes, while at the same time it adopted the secondary effects justi-
fication ofJustice Souter's Barnes concurrence as its overriding ration-
ale. Both of these movements significantly altered the landscape of
nude dancing First Amendment doctrine... . .. 130
After disposing of the issue of justiciability, the plurality began
by acknowledging precedents that hold nude dancing to be expressive
124 For the text of the ordinance, see supra note 22.
1 City of Erie v. Pap's, A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (holding that an ordinance
banning public nudity was content-neutral and thus did not unconstitutionally burden
the expressive conduct of a nude dancing establishment). For a concise summary of
the Justices' positions, see Erin Buford Vinett, Annual Survey of Caselaw: Constitutional
Law, 23 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCKL. REv. 1059, 1073-77 (2001).
6 justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, Kennedy, and Breyer joined the plurality opin-
ion with respect to nude dancing doctrine. Pap's, 529 U.S. at 282.
127 Id. at 302-10 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the case should have been
dismissed as moot and disagreeing with the Court's mode of analysis on the merits).
128 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 581-87 (Souter,J., concurring).
19 Pap's, 529 U.S. at 316 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(acknowledging that his "partial dissent rested on a demand for an evidentiary basis"
that he failed to make in Barnes). Justice Stevens, writing for himself and Justice Gins-
burg, authored a stinging partial dissent in part that attacked every aspect of the plu-
rality opinion:
Under today's opinion, a State may totally ban speech based on its secondary
effects-which are defined as those effects that "happen to be associated" with
speech .... Because the category of effects that "happen to be associated"
with speech includes the narrower subset of effects caused by speech, today's
holding has the effect of swallowing whole a most fundamental principle of
First Amendment jurisprudence.
Id. at 323 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1988)).
130 Id. at 289 ("Although the issue is close, we conclude that the case is not
moot."). Note that support for the mootness holding came from Justice Souter's par-
tial concurrence in part; Justice Scalia, concurring only in the judgment, sharply dis-
agreed with this aspect of the plurality opinion. Id. at 302 (Scalia, J., concurring)
("The case before us here is moot.").
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conduct but ignored the scope of those holdings by concluding that
nude dancing "falls only within the outer ambit of the First Amend-
ment's protection." 3' Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor then
"clarified" Barnes and held definitively that government restrictions on
public nudity should be evaluated under the "less stringent" O'Brien
test for content-neutral restrictions on symbolic speech if the city's
132purpose was unrelated to the protected expression. The ordinance
at issue, the plurality concluded, was fundamentally similar to that in
Barnes-a general prohibition that does not target nudity containing
an erotic message.
Importantly-and unlike Barnes33 -the plurality made this deter-
mination in the face of evidence directly to the contrary. 34 In the
preamble of the ordinance, the Erie City Council explicitly stated its
purpose as "limiting a recent increase in nude live entertainment within the
City." 35 Justice Stevens' reading of the record revealed that a "near
obsessive preoccupation" with nude dancing clubs was evident in City
Council records. 3 6 Furthermore, counsel for the City stipulated to the
trial court that nudity in theater productions would not be pre-' 37
vented. The ordinance was specifically targeted at nude dancing es-
tablishments with regard to both its "applicable scope and the city's
enforcement."
38
The plurality ignored this evidence of content discrimination in
favor of another governmental purpose-combating negative secon-
131 Id. at 289 (relying on Barnes, 501 U.S. at 565-66, which viewed nude dancing as
only marginally "expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amend-
ment").
132 Id.
133 For a detailed explanation of why the Erie ordinance differs from the Indiana
law in Barnes, see id. at 325-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting), in which Justice Stevens stated:
"Several differences between the Erie ordinance and the statute at issue in Barnes belie
the Court's assertion that the two laws are 'almost identical.'
134 See id. at 326 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[B]oth the text of the ordinance and the
reasoning in the Court's opinion make it pellucidly clear that the city of Erie has pro-
hibited nude dancing 'precisely because of its communicative attributes."' (quoting Barnes,
501 U.S. at 577 (ScaliaJ., concurring in judgment))).
135 Id. at 327 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added by Justice Stevens) (quoting
the preamble to the ordinance).
See id. at 331 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("We should not stretch to embrace fanci-
ful explanations when the most natural reading of the ordinance unmistakably identi-
fies its intended target.").
137 See id. at 328 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[A]s stipulated in the record, the city
permitted a production of Equus to proceed without prosecution, even after the ordi-
nance was in effect, and despite its awareness of the nudity involved.").
138 Id.
THE FIRST AMENDMENT GONE A WRY
dary effects. Justice O'Connor classified such evidence-no matter
how obvious-to be that of only an "alleged illicit motive" into which
the Court chose not to inquire.30 Rather, the plurality independently
designated the suppression of secondary effects as the predominate
purpose of the ordinance. Furthermore, while the Court went to
great lengths to distinguish between regulations targeting the primary
effects of nude dancing-the effect on the audience-and those tar-
geting secondary effects, such as impacts on public health, safety, and
welfare,140 it offered virtually no explanation of why the two purposes
are not inherently related. Perhaps recognizing this quandary, Justice
O'Connor analogized the Erie ordinance to the factual situations in
O'Brien, Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,1 4 ' and Ward v. RockO'Bien Clrkv. ommniy fr "44
Against Racism14'-symbolic speech cases where general laws had inci-
dental effects on expression. Justice O'Connor concluded that, al-
though it does have an effect on protected speech, the instant case is
similar because it produces only a de minimis effect on the overall ex-
pression by requiring the wearing of pasties and G-strings, and that
such "de minimis intrusions on expression... cannot be sufficient to
render an ordinance content based."143 Justice O'Connor noted fur-
ther that a city is justified in enacting an ordinance that bans public
nudity to combat the secondary effects that may result while simulta-
neously singling out one specific example of public nudity (e.g., nude
dancing) as particularly problematic.'" As such, the plurality left itself
in a confusing position. After concluding that the intent of the ordi-
nance was unrelated to the suppression of expression under the sec-
ondary effects rationale, the plurality also attempted to justify the or-
dinance by claiming its suppression of expression was minimal.
139 Id. at 292 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (noting
that the "Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of
an alleged illicit legislative motive")).
140 Id. at 290-92 ("[T]he ordinance prohibiting public nudity is aimed at combat-
ing crime and other negative secondary effects caused by the presence of adult enter-
tainment establishments... and not at suppressing the erotic messages conveyed by
this type of nude dancing.").
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (upholding a law
prohibiting protesters from occupying space overnight on the National Mall).
142 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (upholding a guideline
regulating sound systems in NewYork's Central Park).
Pap's, 529 U.S. at 294.
144 Id. at 295 ("[T]here is nothing objectionable about a city passing a general or-
dinance to ban public nudity.., and at the same time recognizing that one specific
occurrence of public nudity-nude erotic dancing-is particularly problematic be-
cause it produces harmful secondary effects.").
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In addition, the plurality, for the first time, used the secondary ef-
fects doctrine to justify restrictions other than the time, place, or
manner of operation of a commercial enterprise-in this case, by up-
holding a general law that has the effect of a total ban on protected
expression."' Moreover, Justice O'Connor for the first time coupled a
secondary effects justification with the more permissive O'Brien sym-
bolic speech test instead of the TPM test used in American Mini Thea-
tres and Renton.146 While the plurality advanced a weak argument that
the ordinance was not actually a total ban (i.e., there is little differ-
ence between fully nude and pasties/G-string) ,'* there is no question
that it did not object to such a ban where it enthusiastically utilized
the O'Brien test, which does not require that any ample alternatives ex-
ist. 48 In doing so-in the words of Professor Arnold Loewy-the court
"subtly but completely, transmogrifies low value speech into no value
speech or nonspeech." 49
145 Note that the plurality disagreed with this observation, and cited Ward as an
instance where the Court relied on Renton tojustify another type of restriction. Id. at
294-95. Justice Stevens correctly indicates, however, that the Ward regulation was actu-
ally a time, place, or manner restriction, and that Ward was not a secondary effects
case, but a symbolic speech case. Id. at 321 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a detailed ar-
gument that this use of the secondary effects doctrine "finds no support whatsoever in
our precedents," see id. at 319-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see the opinion of
James S. Malloy, who miraculously concludes "the Court's decision was based on sound
constitutional principles that are firmly established in precedent." James S. Malloy, A
Content Neutral Public Nudity Ordinance That Satisfies the O'Brien Test May Require Erotic
Dancers to Wear C-Strings and Pasties Without Violating Their First Amendment Right of Free-
dom ofExpression: City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 39 DUQ. L. REv. 705, 728 (2001).
See also id. at 324-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for mistaking
its secondary effects cases with the incidental burdens doctrine applied in cases such as
O'Brien).
147 Id. at 296-97. But see id. at 318 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Despite the similarity
between the messages conveyed by the two forms of dance, they are not identical.");
Miller v. South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1089-104 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring)
(describing a significant difference between the two messages and holding that nonob-
scene nude dancing of the barroom variety performed as entertainment was expres-
sion and thus entitled to a protection under the First Amendment, and that an Indiana
statute, which on its face provided for a total ban on nudity in public places, was un-
constitutional as applied to prohibit such dancing).
148 See Pap's, 529 U.S. at 319 (Stevens,J., dissenting) ("If one assumes that the same
erotic message is conveyed by nude dancers as by those wearing miniscule costumes,
one means of expressing the message is banned; if one assumes that the messages are
different, one of those messages is banned. In either event, the ordinance is a total
ban." (footnote omitted)).
149 Arnold H. Loewy, The Use, Nonuse, and Misuse of Low Value Speech, 58 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 195, 220 (2001). Only speech of some value is entitled to protection, and
the Court had already enshrined adult expression within the ambit of at least low-value
speech in American Mini Theatres. Loewy makes the logical observation: "Obviously,
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Applying the O'Brien test led the plurality to the rapid conclusion
that the Erie ordinance passed constitutional muster in the same
manner as the Indiana statute in Barnes did. 1 5  Justice O'Connor
found the first prong-whether the government exercised authority
pursuant to the Constitution-was satisfied by Erie's police power to
protect public health and safety.'5 ' To fulfill the important or substan-
tial governmental interest prong (the second prong), the plurality
found that Erie could have "reasonably rel[ied] on the evidentiary
foundation set forth in Renton and American Mini Theatres to the effect
that secondary effects are caused by the presence of even one adult
entertainment establishment in a given neighborhood."15 2  Justice
O'Connor credited the city council members' "expert judgment,"
contained in findings made over the course of a century about the
negative effects of "lewd, immoral" activities as sufficient justification
of the governmental interest required by O'Brien.'5 Next, the plural-
ity's analysis of O'Brien's third prong-whether government interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression-grew even more def-
something is wrong here. If speech is protected, even low value speech, it cannot be
precluded because it is immoral." Id. at 219. He concludes by suggesting that "[1low
value speech, properly conceived, provides an important detente for utterances that
are worthy of some constitutional protection, but are not the functional equivalent of
full value political speech.... Stripped of its misuses, low value speech should be cele-
brated as a means to protect both free speech and society." Id. at 225.
John F. Wirenius exposes the fruitlessness of this type of speech value paradox:
"[The] center needs to be fleshed out, both in terms of its justifications, and in appli-
cation across the board. This means weeding out the false conflicts-discarding the
nonsense about 'high-' and 'low-' value speech in favor of a functional approach to the
First Amendment." JOHN F. WIRENIUS, FIRST AMENDMENT, FIRST PRINCIPLES: VERBAL
ACTS AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 123 (2000); see also R. GEORGE WRIGHT, THE FUTURE OF
FREE SPEECH LAW 219-20 (1990) (arguing a basic thesis that free speech caselaw has
become "pathologically complex," and that the scope of coverage of the Free Speech
Clause should be determined by the broadest range of purposes or values that can co-
herently be thought to underlie the Free Speech Clause).
150 Pap's, 529 U.S. at 296-97.
151 Id. at 296.
152 Id. at 297.
153 Justice O'Connor noted:
The preamble to the ordinance states that 'the Council of the City of Erie has,
at various times over more than a century, expressed its findings that certain
lewd, immoral activities carried on in public places for profit are highly detri-
mental to the public health, safety and welfare .... The city council members,
familiar with commercial downtown Erie, are the individuals who would likely
have had firsthand knowledge of what took place at and around nude dancing
establishments in Erie, and can make particularized, expert judgments about
their resulting secondary effects.
Id. at 297-98.
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erential by giving municipalities "sufficient leeway" to combat secon-
dary effects however they see fit, and by deeming empirical data un-
necessary since Erie had already shown a substantial government in-
terest and documented its own experience on the issue. Justice
O'Connor candidly admitted that "requiring dancers to wear pasties
and G-strings may not greatly reduce secondary effects," but asserted
that "O'Brien requires only that the regulation further the interest in
combating such effects."'55 Finally, Justice Souter's concurrence held
that the ordinance satisfied O'Brien's fourth prong-"that the restric-
tion is no greater than essential to the furtherance of the government
interest" -5 6 by returning to the tenuous argument that the effect of
pasties and a G-string is de minimis; the opinion even made the surpris-
ing suggestion that other means, such as zoning, would quite possibly
be no less of a burden than Erie's total ban.
5 7
Other opinions in the case are notable when contrasted with the
plurality's rationale. Justice Scalia echoed the sentiments of his Barnes
concurrence by asserting that it was not the communicative character
of nude dancing that provoked the ban and then made the difficult
argument that suppressing nude dancing is not the same thing as
suppressing what nude dancing communicates. Interestingly, Jus-
tice Scalia-who saw no need to apply the secondary effects doctrine
at all-saw fit to comment that he is "highly skeptical" that the means
chosen by Erie would do anything to further the governmental goal of
reducing secondary effects.'"
Justice Souter also took issue with the plurality's use of the secon-
dary effects doctrine. In recanting part of his Barnes concurrence,160
154 Id. at 298-300.
155 Id. at 301. But see id. at 314 n.2 (SouterJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("It is not apparent to me as a matter of common sense that establishments fea-
turing dancers with pasties and G-strings will differ markedly in their effects on neigh-
borhoods from those whose dancers are nude."); id. at 324 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("It
is one thing to say, however, that O'Brien is more lenient .... It is quite another to say
that the test can be satisfied by nothing more than the mere possibility of de minimis
effects on the neighborhood.").
156 Id. at 301.
157 Id. But see id. at 316 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (ex-
plaining that there were zoning ordinances already in effect to regulate nude dancing
establishments, but they were not enforced by the City of Erie).
158 Id. at 310 (Scalia,J., concurring).
.159 Id.
1W Id. at 316 (SouterJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[M]y mistake
calls to mind Justice Jackson's foolproof explanation of a lapse of his own, when he
quoted Samuel Johnson, 'Ignorance, sir, ignorance."' (quoting McGrath v. Kristensen,
340 U.S. 162,178 (1950))).
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Justice Souter demanded "some factual justification to connect [sec-
ondary effects] with the regulation in issue." 61 Souter argued for an
evidentiary basis for both the harm the municipality claims to flow
from the expressive activity and the amelioration expected from the
restriction imposed. He found no evidence yet established in the
record to support either connection. The plurality responded to Jus-
tice Souter's arguments by asserting that Renton was still the control-
ling precedent on the secondary effects evidentiary standard regard-
less of the Justice's change of mind. This sudden fallback on
precedent is both ironic and unconvincing given the plurality's unbi-
ased willingness to ignore far greater precedent belying a total ban on
protected adult expression.
V. DANCING AROUND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: THE DANGERS OF PAP'S
A. Content Discrimination Analysis and a Potential
Total Ban of Protected Expression
Phrased succinctly by Professor Geoffrey Stone, the central con-
cern of traditional content discrimination analysis is whether restric-
tions, "by limiting the availability of particular means of communica-
tion, can significantly impair the ability of individuals to
communicate ... to others."64 To the extent that laws impede this
end, they "frustrate individual 'self-fulfillment." 65  Professor Cass
Sunstein echoed this First Amendment master value when he con-
cluded that "viewpoint restrictions are.., inconsistent with a central
premise of any system of free expression-that the usual remedy for
harmful speech is more speech rather than enforced silence."
66
Professor Stone argued convincingly in 1983 that the Court's ap-
proach to content-neutral review seemed "a sensible response" to the
concern that content-neutral restrictions can diminish the opportuni-
161 Id. at 311 (SouterJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
162 Id. at 313; see also id. at 323 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("To believe that the man-
datory addition of pasties and a G-string will have any kind of noticeable impact on
secondary effects requires nothing short of a titanic surrender to the implausible.").
163 Id. at 295. But note that Renton employed a TPM analysis, not the more per-
missive O'Brien test.
I Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 47, at 193.
165 Id. at 193; see also id. at 193 n.8 (collecting literature on values underlying the
First Amendment).
166 Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 611
(citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis,J., concurring)).
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ties for free expression. 16 That approach allowed the Court to exam-
ine carefully restrictions that "seriously threaten" First Amendment
rights and to balance them against legitimate governmental inter-
ests. 16  However, even at that early date in the realm of this area of
First Amendmentjurisprudence, Stone posited that the Court "should
be more skeptical of claimed government interests."'
6
In Renton, the Court was willing to characterize a restrictive zoning
law as content-neutral because it was justified without reference to the
adult content (i.e., based on secondary effects)."7 However, as a time,
place, or manner restriction, the Court applied the more restrictive
TPM test-which required ample alternative means of communica-
tion-and hinged its decision on the fact that five percent of available
zoned land in Renton was still available to adult business owners.171
This reasoning dovetails with the primary focus of content discrimina-
tion analysis.
The Court's application of content discrimination analysis in Pap's
has taken the opposite tack. In Pap's, the plurality evinced a contin-
ued strong desire to view laws that, in effect, restrict adult businesses,
as content-neutral. But Pap's, like Barnes, involved a general law that
had the potential to be a total ban on nude adult entertainment. The
plurality chose to examine that law under O'Brien's permissive sym-
bolic speech analysis. Viewed in terms of the possibility of a total pro-
hibition, the continued use of the traditional content discrimination
analytical framework in such situations is extremely problematic, be-
cause it ignores the fundamental concern that opportunities for expres-
sion be preserved. Even if one were to grant that secondary effects
were a legitimate justification for a content-neutral determination un-
der the traditional framework, the effect of the law in question under-
mines the goal of that analysis to the point that it becomes an unten-
167 Stone, Content-Neutra supra note 47, at 77.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 79.
170 See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (holding that an
ordinance prohibiting adult motion picture theaters from locating within 1,000 feet of
any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school was a
valid governmental response to the problems created by adult theaters and satisfied
the dictates of the First Amendment, because the ordinance does not bar adult thea-
ters altogether, and therefore was properly analyzed as a form of time, place, or man-
ner regulation).
171 Id. at 53. The Renton Court went so far as to cite a critical passage from Ameri-
can Mini Theatres where the Court cautioned against the enactment of regulations that
have "the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting access to, lawful speech." Id. at 54
(citing Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.35 (1976)).
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able constitutional tool, leading one to doubt whether upholding such
a law is the type of "sensible response" of which scholars have previ-
ously approved.
One commentator, arguing for a restrictive interpretation of Ren-
ton, acknowledged this underlying problem and argued that constru-
ing Renton's approval of the secondary effects/content-neutral analysis
as limited to only subject-matter restrictions would preserve the cen-
tral values of the First Amendment."' In effect, the Pap's endorse-
ment of the potential total ban of nude dancing by a general nudity
law is a type of viewpoint discrimination,'173 not subject-matter dis-
crimination, as in the case of zoning laws that specifically regulate
adult businesses. The result of the Pap's general law is that one par-
ticular viewpoint (expressive message)-which is communicated by
fully nude dancing itself-can be completely suppressed.1 7 ' The Pap's
172 See Free Speech Analysis, supra note 50, at 1912-17 (arguing that Renton should be
construed as limited to only subject-matter-based restrictions on speech, such as time,
place, or manner restrictions).
173 Susan Williams offers a concise explanation of the continuum of discrimination
in terms of the content category at which a regulation is aimed. She explains how
viewpoint discrimination is at the most biased end of the spectrum, while subject-
matter restrictions lie in the middle. Williams, supra note 47, at 655-57.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit used this rationale when it invali-
dated an anti-pornography law in American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323,
332 (7th Cir. 1985), affd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). The court of appeals held the law
unconstitutional on grounds of viewpoint discrimination because it "established an
'approved' view of women." Id. at 328. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed. See
Sunstein, supra note 166, at 609 (discussing the court of appeals' rejection of a law that
acted as a form of "thought control").
174 See Pap's, 529 U.S. at 318-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that even if the
difference in message between fully nude dancing and dancing with pasties and a G-
string is very small, there is still a difference and thus the law restricts a particular view-
point). The most elegant explanations of the expressive viewpoint of nude dancing
over less revealing forms of erotic dance are offered by Judge Richard Posner as part of
a concurring opinion in Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1089-104 (7th
Cir. 1990). Posner aptly observes that
[t]he goal of the striptease-a goal to which the dancing is indispensable-is
to enforce the association: to make plain that the performer is not removing
her clothes [for other reasons]; to insinuate that she is removing them be-
cause she is preparing for, thinking about, and desiring sex.... The sequel is
left to the viewer's imagination. This is the "tease" in "striptease."
Id. at 1091. Posner expounds on this characterization in Sex and Reason: "[T]here is
an implicit narrative which the viewer is left to complete in his imagination. That is
why it is important that the striptease not end in a bathing suit, because a bathing suit
is for swimming, not for sex... . The erotic signal... imparts to striptease an unmis-
takably, and ordinarily a dominant, aphrodisiacal effect." POSNER, supra note 1, at 364
(1992). As Steven Gey appropriately concludes, opponents have "fundamentally mis-
construed the nature of pornography and that only by accepting their cropped view of
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holding ignores this distinction, and in doing so forgets that "view-
point discrimination poses a more serious threat to [F]irst
[A] mendment values: by doing less than it might government some-
times does more than it may.
175
B. Purposive Theory and Ignorance of Audience Viewpoint
Stemming directly from this first problem is a second danger: that
the governmental "purposive" analysis, approved by the Court in
Barnes and validated in Pap's, does not devote enough attention to the
motive requirement of Renton-that the law be "'justified without ref-
erence to the content of the regulated speech.' 176 By not applying a
more reasonable and careful motive analysis, the plurality has aggra-
vated the difficulty in identifying laws that are portrayed as subject-
matter restrictions but really are viewpoint restrictions."' Professor
communication and ideas can their repressive goals be justified." Steven G. Gey, The
Apologetics of Suppression: The Regulation of Pornography as Act and Idea, 86 MICH. L. REv.
1564, 1566 (1988); see also Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 501 F.2d 18, 21 n.3 (2d Cir. 1974),
affid in part sub nom. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975) (" [W]hile the enter-
tainment afforded by a nude ballet at Lincoln Center to those who can pay the price
may differ vastly in content (as viewed by judges) or in quality (as viewed by critics), it
may not differ in substance from the dance viewed by the person who... wants some
'entertainment' with his beer or shot of rye.");JUDITH LYNNE HANNA, DANCE, SEX AND
GENDER: SIGNS OF IDENTITY, DOMINANCE, DEFIANCE AND DESIRE 22-23 (1988) (discuss-
ing the sexuality of dance and its ability to cause vicarious, empathic experiences in its
spectators).
Free Speech Analysis, supra note 50, at 1915. This commentator argues in detail
for the vitality of the subject-matter/viewpoint distinction and appropriate, differing
levels of scrutiny. See id. at 1913-17; see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Be-
cause of Its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81,
83-88 (1978) (examining the Courts' varying approaches to dealing with challenges to
content-based restrictions and the distinction between subject matter and viewpoint
regulations). But see Sunstein, supra note 166, at 612-13 (arguing that anti-
pornography legislation is aimed at harms, not viewpoint, and that Renton should be
read to focus the analysis on content, not viewpoint).
176 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976) ). Elena Kagan argues that First Amendment law actually has as its
primary, but unstated, object the discovery of improper governmental motives, and
that application of First Amendment law is really "a kind of motive-hunting." Elena
Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment
Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996). Kagan asks the obvious question-why
would an analytical framework unconcerned with illicit motives have generated the
content-based/content-neutral distinction in the first place? Id.
177 See Free Speech Analysis, supra note 50, at 1922 ("[C]ourts should be hesitant to
accord deferential treatment to seemingly viewpoint-neutral subject matter restric-
tions."); Paul B. Stephan III, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L.
REV. 203, 203-06 (1982) (arguing in favor of the distinction). But see Note, Content
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Sunstein (although admittedly arguing against viewing anti-
pornography regulations as viewpoint restrictions) suggests that
"[w]lhether a classification is viewpoint-based thus ultimately turns on
the viewpoint of the decisionmaker.""' s If so, the Pap's Court, by refus-
ing to engage in a thorough motive investigation, foreclosed the pos-
sibility of an accurate viewpoint restriction determination.
In response, Elena Kagan argues that the content-based/content-
neutral distinction implicitly flushes out improper purposes.9 While
that may be true elsewhere, it appears to have failed dramatically in
the case of nude dancing, where the Pap's Court made its content-
neutral determination in the face of direct evidence of improper mo-
tive. In Pap's, there was clear evidence that the Erie City Council not
only passed the ordinance for the express purpose of targeting and
reducing the number of nude dancing establishments, but that it also
intended to enforce the general nudity law solely against such estab-
lishments. The Preamble to the Erie ordinance specifically stated that
the "'Council specifically wishes to adopt the concept of Public Inde-
cency prohibited by the laws of the State of Indiana... for the purpose
of limiting a recent increase in the nude live entertainment within the City.'" 80
Furthermore, City of Erie Counsel stipulated that mainstream theater
productions involving nudity would be allowed to continue unde-
terred. 8
While no such positive evidence existed in Barnes, the Pap's plural-
ity-when directly confronted with it-declined to consider the ex-
trinsic evidence of improper motive.182  But the plurality glaringly
Regulation and the Dimensions of Free Expression, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1854, 1867-72 (1983)
(argu ing for an alternative approach).
Sunstein, supra note 166, at 615; see also STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 18-19 (1990) (noting that an "analysis of the
first amendment can not be reduced to a concern about government motives").
179 See Kagan, supra note 176, at 451 (contending, in fact, that flushing out im-
pro er purpose is a goal of the doctrine).
Pap's, 529 U.S. at 327 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. at 42a, City of Erie v. Pap's
A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (1999) (No. 98-1161)).
181 Id. at 327-29; see also id. at 328 (Stephens, J., dissenting) ("As presented to us,
the ordinance is deliberately targeted at Kandyland's type of nude dancing (to the ex-
clusion of plays like Equus), in terms of both its applicable scope and the city's en-
forcement.").
182 See id. at 292 ("[T]his Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional
statute on the basis of an alleged illicit motive."). Justice Stevens took issue with what
he characterized as an overbroad interpretation of O'Brien. He suggested that what
O'Brien actually stated was that a law would not be struck down on the assumption of a
wrongful purpose or motive. He also indicated that there was no need to do so in the
instant case because the unambiguous statements of the city council members were
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failed to acknowledge that in light of such evidence, the law might not
have been "otherwise constitutional," since the truth about it would
have been revealed: it was really a viewpoint restriction that required
strict scrutiny. This blissful ignorance (or deliberate unwillingness to
address the issue) is frustrating; it disguises the real question of consti-
tutionality by skipping the spirit of Renton's crucial motive analysis al-
together. Narrowly defined, Renton does not permit the circumven-
tion of strict scrutiny adopted by the plurality in Pap's.
18 3
Part and parcel of this problem is the Court's continued refusal to
include an analysis of discrimination from the audience viewpoint in
nude dancing cases. Is4 Content-neutral regulations "can have a dis-
criminatory effect on the speech market available to would-be listen-
ers."18 5 As Susan Williams suggests, "the relevant question concerning
discrimination is whether the impact of the regulation falls evenly
across the speech marketplace or disproportionately on one part of
it." '" From the perspective of the audience, even a regulation that
could be justified as "content-neutral" might prohibit some kinds of
speech more than others. This question of audience discrimination-
a question which should be asked and answered independent of the
government's purpose-is especially relevant in nude dancing cases.
From the audience perspective, the Pap's law completely eliminates a
already in the record. Id. at 330 n.16; see also TRIBE, supra note 15, at § 12-5, at 819-20
(suggesting that the Court's interpretation of O'Brien is overbroad).
3 See Free Speech Analysis, supra note 50, at 1923 ("Broadly construed, Renton per-
mits circumvention of strict scrutiny.... To avoid this result, courts must conduct
more than a cursory motive inquiry.").
184 The special involvement of the audience in this type of entertainment militates
strongly in favor of considering audience viewpoint. See supra note 174 (listing and
discussing sources dealing with nude dancing and its viewers); see also PORN 101, supra
note 12, at 289 ("Plainly the porn viewing experience is more involved than first meets
the eye; where the actual imagery is sometimes less significant than the feelings,
thoughts, and associations going on inside the viewer's head."). The audience, in
words borrowed from Milton, is able to "consider vice with all her baits and seeming
pleasures, and yet abstain, and yet distinguish, and yet prefer that which is truly bet-
ter." ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 543 (1941).
185 Williams, supra note 47, at 658; see also id. at 658-60 (describing views on audi-
ence discrimination by content-neutral regulation); Kagan, supra note 176, at 423-27
(examining perspectives on the First Amendment including the "speaker-based" and
"audience-based" models); William E. Lee, Lonely Pamphleteers, Little People, and the Su-
preme Court: The Doctrine of Time, Place, and Manner Regulations of Expression, 54 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 757, 764-71 (1986) (arguing that content-neutral regulations have prob-
lematic discriminatory effects); Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First
Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 130-31 (1981) (arguing that content-neutral
regulations should not receive less scrutiny than other types of restrictions).
186 Williams, supra note 47, at 658.
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particular content category; furthermore, enforcement actions fall
disproportionately on that category as a result of the government's so-
cial policy choices. The plurality in Pap's, however, declined to even
examine this question, focusing its analysis solely on the government's
purpose rather than on the law's impact on particular audiences.
When justified by secondary effects, that analysis completely fore-
187
stalled any consideration of audience discrimination.
To illustrate this concern, Williams offers a hypothetical that high-
lights the importance of pamphleteering to an audience of poor peo-
118ple, who cannot afford other ways of publicizing their message. A
general law restricting pamphleteering would impact that audience
disproportionately, raising a substantial question of content discrimi-
nation. Similarly, audience discrimination is particularly problematic
in the case of live, nude dancing establishments. Such venues are fre-
quently limited sharply by number and separated by geography; they
are often few and far between. Laws such as the Erie Ordinance may
foreclose all access to this particular form of entertainment for those
without access to transportation and financial means to travel great
distances to operating clubs in other localities. Hard-core adult movie
theaters and adult video rental stores within the same geographic area
are not adequate substitutes, as their messages are decidedly different
from live, expressive dance.'" Similar to pamphleteering regulations,
a general law prohibiting nudity thus impacts the geographically re-
stricted live nude dancing audience disproportionately, raising a real
question of content discrimination that will be difficult for the Court
to continue to ignore.
187 Note that, despite substantial advocacy by commentators, the Supreme Court
has yet to exhibit any real approval of audience-discrimination analysis. See Members
of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 n.30 (1984) (noting
that solicitude to the concept of audience discrimination has "practical boundaries").
188 See Williams, supra note 47, at 658-59 (positing that, from the perspective of the
audience deprived of particular points of view, restrictions with a non-communicative
purpose can raise serious questions of content discrimination).
189 See Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1099 (7th Cir. 1990) (Pos-
ner, J., concurring) ("There are exceptions to the parity of the live and the canned
performance.... [I]t might be possible to distinguish between live and canned nude
dancing on the ground that in the former the dancers are accessible to the audience
...")
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C. Runaway Secondary Effects Doctrine
1. Troubling Expansion
The Pap's plurality dangerously extended the secondary effects
doctrine beyond existing precedent. For the first time, the doctrine
was used to justify a total prohibition of a form of protected expres-
sion.19 ° Never before had the Court used the secondary effects justifi-
cation in an adult entertainment case to sustain anything other than a
time, place, or manner zoning restriction. 9' In both American Mini
Theatres and Renton, essential elements of the holdings were that the
ordinances be directed only at the places where expression might be
presented, and that the regulations did not interfere with content. A
critical argument in each of the opinions was that the regulations un-
der consideration did not significantly curtail adult entertainment
presentations or the opportunity for a message to reach an audience.
However, the Pap's plurality refused to recognize this explicit limita-
tion, maintaining that there was no total ban because only "one par-
ticular means" was "limit[ed]."'9 Because the plurality could not rely
on Renton, it had to fall back upon an analogy to O'Brien, which was
not even a secondary effects case.193
This extension of the secondary effects doctrine is dangerous be-
cause it undermines what the Renton Court described as "the funda-
mental principle that underlies our concern about 'content-based'
190 Cf Rondi Thorp, City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., The First Amendment: Wounded in the
War for Freedom of Expression, 36 GONZ. L. REV. 183, 187-201 (2000-2001) (arguing that
the Court should have passed on this dangerous holding and instead opted to either
strike down the Erie statute based on a theory of statutory overbreadth, or upheld it by
classifying nude dancing as obscenity under Miller). Although I seriously question
whether either of these actions has real potential for success, I credit Ms. Thorp for
keeping a focus on the benefits of avoiding the dangerous corner into which the Court
has p.ainted itself.
, While Justice Souter advanced this theory in his Barnes concurrence, the plural-
ity declined to adopt it and justified its opinion with arguments about the traditional
power of the state to regulate for the health, welfare, and morality of the people. See
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 567-70 (1991) (providing an understanding
of the plurality's reasoning on this point); see also Pap's, 529 U.S. at 317-18 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("Until now, the 'secondary effects' of commercial enterprises featuring
indecent entertainment have justified only the regulation of their location. For the
first time, the Court has now held that such effects may justify the total suppression of
protected speech.").
102 529 U.S. at 293.
193 O'Brien was decided as a symbolic speech/incidental burdens case. See United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-86 (1968) (outlining the Court's analysis of the
First Amendment issues in this case).
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speech regulations: that 'government may not grant the use of a fo-
rum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those
wishing to express less favored or more controversial views.'
19 4 In-
deed it was only "with this understanding in mind" that the American
Mini Theatres majority decided that secondary effects-justified regula-
tions be examined under the standards applicable to TPM restrictions,
requiring ample alternative avenues of communication to exist.
'"
Likewise, the Renton ordinance only "'circumscribe [d adult estab-
lishments'] choice as to location."1 96 In effect, the Pap's plurality di-
rectly contradicted the Court's prior statement that "the First
Amendment requires ... that [the city] refrain from effectively denying
respondents a reasonable opportunity to open and operate ... within
the city."'97  Likewise, the Pap's decision is irreconcilable with the
Court's holding in Schad: "It]he Court did not imply that a munici-
pality could ban all adult theaters-much less all live entertainment or
all nude dancing-from its commercial districts citywide."
9 8 The only
difference between Pap's, on the one hand, and American Mini Thea-
tres, Renton, and Schad, on the other hand, is that Erie disguised its at-
tempt in a general law. Erie's nudity law in effect does exactly what
those cases admonished could not be allowed, but the Pap's plurality
was simply willing to ignore this wolf in sheep's clothing."""
As Justice Stevens observed in his dissent, "[u]nder today's opin-
ion, a State may totally ban speech based on its secondary effects-
which are defined as those effects that 'happen to be associated' with
speech."200 The grave implications of this extension may be felt in all
areas of protected speech. Pap's reinforces Justice Brennan's original
194 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48-49 (1986) (citing Po-
lice Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 404 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972)).
195 Id. at 49.
1% Id. at 48 (quoting Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 82 n.4
(1976)).
197 Id. at 54 (emphasis added).
198 Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 71 (1981).
199 See also Pap's, 529 U.S. at 322 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The fact that this cen-
sorship may have a laudable ulterior purpose cannot mean that censorship is not cen-
sorship."). Many jurisdictions have applied the secondary effects doctrine to justify
nude dancing regulations. See Hudson, supra note 14, at 73-74 n.127 (listing post-
Barnes cases that apply the secondary effects doctrine to regulate nude dancing estab-
lishments); see also Clinton P. Hansen, Note, To Strip or Not to Strip: The Demise of Nude
Dancing and Erotic Expression Through Cumulative Regulations, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 561,
584-601 (2001) (describing nine different types of regulations that have some poten-
tially successful secondary effects justification and which, when used together, consti-
tute a cumulative adult use ordinance).
200 Pap's, 529 U.S. at 323 (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1988)).
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fear that the secondary effects doctrine "creates a possible avenue for
governmental censorship whenever censors can concoct 'secondary'
rationalizations for regulating the content of political speech." 0 1 Al-
ready, the Supreme Court has indicated a willingness to extend the
application of the secondary effects doctrine to time, place, or man-
ner restrictions on "high-value" political speech. In Boos v. Barry, a
plurality suggested that a District of Columbia law restricting picket
signs within five hundred feet of an embassy could be constitutional if
it focused on the secondary effects of picket signs such as "conges-
tion," "interference with ingress or egress," or "visual clutter."20 2 In-
deed, in the past ten years, the secondary effects doctrine has been
used tojustify regulation of all kinds of speech, including commercial,
203noncommercial, and political speech. Instead of reining in this
runaway censorship vehicle, the Pap's Court gave its overt approval for
total suppression of nude dancing under a general law, thereby leav-
ing open the possibility to develop more complete bans on other types
of protected speech beyond mere time, place, or manner restrictions.
2. Evidentiary Basis and the Relationship Between
Secondary Effects and Regulations
Pap's raises two major evidentiary concerns regarding the secon-
dary effects doctrine. As Justice Souter reads First Amendment
precedent, a regulating government should have to show both real
harms it claims flow from an expressive activity and evidence that the
regulation in question will alleviate them in a direct and material204
manner. With regard to the first prong, real harms, the Pap's plural-
ity dangerously reinforced the holding that municipalities need not
develop an independent evidentiary basis for the secondary effects
they use to justify a regulation of protected speech. Instead, the plu-
rality was willing to trust the city's "expert judgments" and accept its
"reasonable belief that the experience of otherjurisdictions is relevant
201 Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 335 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
202 Id. at 321; see also Hudson, supra note 14, at 74-77 (detailing the expansion of
secondary effects doctrine outside the adult entertainment industry); Servodidio, supra
note 13, at 1241-44 (discussing the expanding notion of secondary effects after Boos).
203 See Hudson, supra note 14, at 77-93 (discussing regulations on commercial,
noncommercial, and political speech justified by lower federal courts on the basis of
secondary effects).
204 Pap's, 529 U.S. at 313-14 (SouterJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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to the problem it is addressing."
20 5
The plurality continued to allow municipalities to analogize evi-
dence gathered by other cities regardless of whether or not it was ob-
tained by studying a city of the same size, location, demographics,
concentration of adult business, or even types of adult businesses.
Three commentators recently evaluated the scientific validity of the
secondary effects studies most often relied upon by cities by abstract-
ing and analyzing their methods and empirical findings. 0 6 Their sci-
entific investigation revealed that, with few exceptions:
[T]he methods most frequently used in these studies are seriously and
often fatally flawed. Specifically, these studies do not adhere to profes-
sional standards of scientific inquiry and nearly all universally fail to
meet the basic assumptions necessary to calculate an error rate-a test of
the reliability of findings in science. More importantly, those studies
that are scientifically credible demonstrate either no negative secondary
effects associated with adult businesses or a reversal of the presumed
207
negative effect.
In a footnote in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the
Court observed that, in a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary
reliability will be based on scientific validity.20 The commentators
suggest that the vast majority of secondary effects studies do not meet
this requirement because they fail to meet four criteria for insuring a
scientifically valid study, 9 making them little more than 'Junk sci-
ence."210  Furthermore, the ten most often cited2 11 of these fatally
205 Id. at 297-98 (citation omitted).
26 Bryant Paul et al., Government Regulation of "Adult" Businesses Through Zoning and
Anti-Nudity Ordinances: Debunking the Legal Myth of Negative Secondary Effects, 6 COMM. L.
& POL'Y 355 (2001).
207 Id. at 367.
208 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.9 (1993).
209 Those criteria consist of the following:
1. A control area equivalent to the area containing the adult entertainment
business;
2. A sufficient period of elapsed time prior to and following opening of the
adult establishment;
3. A crime rate measured according to the same valid source for all areas
considered, with crime information factual and reliable; and
4. Properly conducted survey research.
Paul et al., supra note 206, at 372-75.
210 Id. at 370.
211 The ten most cited studies are (with number of citations in parentheses):
1. Indianapolis, IN - 1984 (22)
2. Phoenix, AZ - 1979 (18)
3. Los Angeles, CA- 1977 (13)
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flawed studies continue to be shared, referenced, and cited by more
and more cities-continuing the web of reliance upon fundamentally
212unreliable evidence. The social scientific study aptly concluded:
[T]here is sufficient room for a serious challenge to the assumption
made by communities across the United States that past studies of sec-
ondary effects show an empirical relationship between adult businesses
and negative effects .... [T]here is presently no legitimate basis for ex-
211tending the secondary effects doctrine... based on these studies.
In Pap's, the plurality condoned the fact that Erie relied on the
same study used by the City of Renton-a Seattle study of the relation-
ship between zoning and secondary effects of adult theaters.1 4 While
it might have been logical for Renton to use the Seattle study (both
zoning, both adult theaters), "r allowing Erie to use that same study
falls far short of the evidentiary basis the Court should have required.
The twenty-year old study involved the secondary effects of a different
type of entertainment in a much larger, urbanized city and its rela-
tionship to a completely different type of regulation. Thus, a Seattle
4. St. Paul, MN - 1987 (13)
5. Austin, TX - 1986 (10)
6. St. Paul, MN - 1987,1988 (9)
7. Amarillo, TX - 1977 (7)
8. Detroit, MI - 1972 (5)
9. Beaumont, TX - 1982 (5)
10. Kent, WA- 1982 (4)
Id. at 369. Cities use combinations of these studies today, often cross-referencing
twenty-year-old studies and duplicating reliance on major studies. For example, the
City of Erie relied on a Seattle study, which had relied on the 1982 Kent, WA study,
which had previously relied on several 1970s studies. Id. The trial of questionable sci-
ence is unmistakable and continues today.
212 Id. at 387. For example, the Indianapolis study, which has been relied upon by
no fewer than twenty-two communities as evidence of a relationship between adult es-
tablishments and negative secondary effects, is terribly flawed and contains serious
methodological flaws-"[t]hus, the potential exists that as many as twenty-two zoning
ordinances have been founded on a false premise about the substantial government
interest in regulating the location of these businesses." Id. at 387-88.
213 Id. at 391.
214 See Pap's, 529 U.S. at 296-97 ("And Erie could reasonably rely on the evidentiary
foundation set forth in Renton... to the effect that secondary effects are caused by the
presence of even one adult entertainment establishment in a given neighborhood.").
The plurality further suggested that "findings" of the city council over a century of sec-
ondary effects flowing from lewd and immoral activities constituted evidence of real
harms. Id. at 297-98. Justice Souter aptly countered this point by responding that the
city council assumes its own conclusion, and that however much the city councilors
believe their conclusions to be true does not decide the evidentiary question. Id. at
314 (Souter,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
215 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
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adult theater zoning study is not rationally transferable as an eviden-
tiary basis for Erie's general nudity law.216 Justice Souter noted this in-
consistency when he found in the record a "failure to reveal any evi-
dence on which Erie may have relied."
21 7  Indeed, Souter was so
troubled by the lack of evidentiary basis that he lamented the portion
of his Barnes concurrence in which he failed to "demand reliance on
germane evidentiary demonstrations."
21s
The acceptance of this most flimsy of proof of real harms is noth-
ing short of a signal to municipalities that even the most transparent,
strained suggestion of a "real harm" will satisfy the plurality's scru-
tiny.219 Tellingly, the original proponent of the secondary effects justi-
fication in nude dancing cases, Justice Souter, admitted his error in
not demanding better evidence. The plurality, however, marched on
and suggested that the proof required for a total ban under a general
law is no greater than that required for a time, place, or manner re-
striction that leaves open ample alternatives. After entrenching sec-
ondary effects as a means to a total ban, the Pap's plurality lowers the
evidentiary bar for this greater suppression.22
0
Second, the plurality accepts Erie's secondary effects justification
even though it bears no reasonable or rational relationship to the par-
ticular means chosen to alleviate those harms. This equally troubling
development signals to municipalities that their regulatory means do
not even have to pass a minimum rationality (i.e., "laugh") test to be
216 See Ortiz, supra note 68, at 963 ("[The Pap's] plurality.., seemed to stretch
what could be considered reasonable.").
217 Pap's, 529 U.S. at 314 (SouterJ, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
ps, Id. at 315 (SouterJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
219 An eyebrow-raising example of this flimsy proof requirement in action can be
found in Restaurant Row Associates v. Horry County, 516 S.E.2d 442, 448 (S.C.), cert. de-
nied, 528 U.S. 1020 (1999), in which the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a city
did not have to make an individualized showing of secondary effects even when the
plaintiff adult entertainment establishment produced expert testimony that no nega-
tive secondary effects would result.
220 This treatment of secondary effects reasoning does not rectify confusion in the
lower courts. Compare Secret Desires Lingerie, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 470 S.E.2d 879, 880
(Ga. 1996), in which the Georgia Supreme Court struck down an ordinance regulating
lingerie modeling studios because the city had failed to consider secondary effects
caused by those specific types of businesses, with ILQ Inv., Inc. v. City of Rochester, 25 F.3d
1413, 1417-18 (8th Cir. 1994), in which the Eighth Circuit upheld use of a general sec-
ondary effects rationale for a regulation zoning bookstores that sold both adult and
mainstream material, despite the fact that the ordinance was tailored based on links to
adult businesses generally. See also Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., & Deanne E. Maynard, Play-
boy and City of Erie: Shfif Toward Balancing, COMM. LAW., Fall 2000, at 12, 16 (describ-
ing how secondary effects arguments are "inherently destabilizing").
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accepted as a legitimate response to specified secondary effects.2
Such permissive analysis belies the Court's own prior conclusion. In
Reno v. ACLU, seven Justices agreed that "the mere fact that a statutory
regulation of speech was enacted for [an] important purpose ... does
not foreclose inquiry into its validity." That decision, striking down
the Communications Decency Act (CDA), further specified that the
"inquiry embodies an 'overarching commitment' to make sure that
Congress has designed its statute to accomplish its purpose 'without
imposing an unnecessarily great restriction on speech.'-2 23 The Court
even noted with disapproval the fact that the record contained no evi-
dence as to how effective or ineffective the regulations might prove to
be.
224
The Pap's plurality cavalierly suggests that "it is evident" that the
Erie nudity law will have the required efficacy.225 This is perhaps the
plurality's most tenuous conclusion, for evidence was neither required
nor offered that the wearing of pasties and G-strings by erotic dancers
would have any remedial effect on the secondary effects associated
with nude dancing establishments. 226 Erie did not point to any study
suggesting that the adverse secondary effects of adult-oriented busi-
nesses offering erotic dancing depends in any way on the precise cos-
tume worn by the performers. Rather, the city "merely assumes it to
be so"227 and the plurality apparently agrees. Furthermore, the pasties
and G-string solution chosen by Erie is not the one suggested by the
221 See Williams, supra note 47, at 654 ("[T]he requirement... amounts to little
more than the most minimal rational relation review .... ").
222 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) (citing Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC,
492 U.S. 115 (1989)).
223 Id. at 876 (quoting Denver Area Ed. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518
U.S. 727, 741 (1996)).
224 See id. at 875 n.41 (analogizing the lack of considered judgment as to the effec-
tiveness of CDA regulations to the similarly vacant legislative history of preceding
adoption of the unacceptable statute struck down in Sable Communications of Calfornia,
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989)).
225 Pap's, 529 U.S. at 300-01.
226 See id. at 313 n.2 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("It is
not apparent to me as a matter of common sense that establishments featuring dancers
with pasties and G-strings will differ markedly in their effects on neighborhoods from
those whose dancers are nude."); id. at 310 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I am highly skep-
tical, to tell the truth, that the addition of pasties and G-strings will at all reduce the
tendency of establishments such as Kandyland to attract crime and prostitution, and
hence to foster sexually transmitted disease.").
227 Id. at 321 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Forsyth County v. Nationalist
Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 (1992) ("Listener's reaction to speech is not a content-
neutral basis for regulation.").
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Seattle study that the city used to arrive at its secondary effects justifi-
2281
cation in the first place. In holding such, the plurality in essence
shifts the burden of proof to adult establishments to disprove proac-
tively the effectiveness of a proposed secondary effects-targeted meas-
ure.
The Pap's plurality thus encourages a two-fold evidentiary failure.
First, it does not require any particularized evidence of real harms as-
sociated with nude dancing establishments. Second, it does not re-
quire a city to tailor its regulation to alleviate those harms (real or
otherwise) in an actual manner. In a case involving a total ban under
a general law (as opposed to a zoning regulation that is more self-
evidently efficacious), a more perceptive reading of precedent sug-
gests that a city should have to make a showing of a causal connection
between the regulated speech and the secondary effects as well as a
rational explanation of how the regulation will alleviate those
harms.229 By not requiring either, the Pap's plurality gives municipali-
ties carte blanche to invent secondary effects and then pass expres-
sion-suppressive regulations that do not actually remedy them-the
ultimate form of approved "improper motive" censorship in disguise.
D. Conflation of Secondary Effects and Symbolic
Speech Analytical Frameworks
In Part II.B.3, I described how the Court has systematically col-
lapsed two doctrines-TPM and symbolic speech/incidental burden-
into one by using the O'Brien test where the TPM test had been previ-
ously employed.13 The Pap's plurality embraces this collapse, indicat-
ing that general nudity laws should be evaluated as restrictions on
symbolic speech under the "less stringent" O'Brien test.
23
1 Under the
O'Brien analysis, the plurality asserts that the Constitution "requires
only that the regulation further the interest in combating such ef-
fects."2, 2 The plurality acknowledges that the Erie regulation-requir-
ing pasties and G-strings-might not have any real remedial effect on
secondary effects, 32 but asserts that, by allowing the government to
22s That study recommended dispersal through zoning. Pap's, 529 U.S. at 321 n.4
(Stevens,J., dissenting).
29 See Free Speech Analysis, supra note 50, at 1923 (indicating that the absence or
presence of an objective nexus can be illustrative of true legislative motive).
230 Supra text accompanying notes 47-65.
231 Pap's, 529 U.S. at 289.
232 Id. at 301.
233 Id.
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experiment with that regulation, its interest would somehow be fur-
234thered. This assumption requires what Justice Stevens sagely re-
ferred to as a "titanic surrender to the implausible."235
By making this assumption, the plurality dangerously "[ignores]
the critical difference between secondary effects caused by speech and
the incidental effects on speech that may be caused by a regulation of
conduct. , 236 Reiterated succinctly:
237
The incidental burdens doctrine applies when "'speech' and 'non-
speech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct," and the
government's interest in regulating the latterjustifies incidental burdens
on the former. Secondary effects, on the other hand, are indirect con-
sequences of protected speech and may justify regulation of the places
238where that speech may occur.
A municipality may have either of these doctrines as its aim when im-
plementing a regulation, but they are not the same.239 The plurality,
however, ignored the difference and, by devolving the analysis to the
O'Brien test, insisted that "both aims are equally unrelated to
speech,240 when they clearly are not.
There were two possible choices as to how Erie could pass a law
that could withstand constitutional muster.24 ' Erie could have aimed
its regulation at something other than speech and then attempted to
justify the law under the incidental burdens doctrine, previously dis-
242cussed. Alternatively, Erie could have justified its law as directly
aimed at the secondary effects caused by (and thus directly related to)
protected speech. It did the latter. Yet the plurality, by conflating the
two doctrines, miraculously arrives at the conclusion that the law is
unrelated to speech. As Justice Stevens suggests, they tried to
"have their cake and eat it too."243  The result is a doctrinal
234 Id. ("Even though the dissent questions the wisdom of Erie's chosen rem-
edy... the 'city must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solu-
tions to admittedly serious problems."' (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 52)).
235 Id. at 323 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
236 Id.
237 For a more thorough explanation, see supra text accompanying notes 4147.
238 Pap's, 529 U.S. at 324-25 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
239 See id. at 325 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("One can think of an apple and an or-
ange at the same time; that does not turn them into the same fruit.").
240 Id.
241 See id. at 326 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I]t cannot conflate the two with the ex-
pectation that Erie's interests aimed at secondary effects will be rendered unrelated to
speech by virtue of this doctrinal polyglot.").
242 For a detailed discussion of this issue, see id. at 324-26 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
243 Id. at 326 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
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maelstrom: 144 The City admitted its law was aimed at secondary effects
caused by protected speech and did not defend the law as only having
created incidental burdens afterward. The plurality, by way of doc-
trine conflation, does the City's work for it. It incorrectly analogizes
Erie's secondary effects claim to the incidental burdens claims in Clark
and Ward,245 and then eliminates the critical "ample alternative ave-
nues" of the TPM test. In addition, the "further the governmental in-
terest" prong of the O'Brien test, as employed by the plurality, is satis-
fied by what it admits to be only a de minimis effect on the
neighborhood.
Professor Erwin Chemerinksy recently criticized such a path by
describing the treatment of "content-based laws as content-neutral be-
cause of a permissible purpose" as one of three major problems with
the Court's application of the principle of content-neutrality."'
Chemerinksy emphasizes that-despite any attendant secondary ef-
fects rationale-if the application of a law depends on the content of
the message, then, by definition, the law is content-based. As he sug-
gests, "[t]he court can uphold it by finding that it serves a sufficiently
important purpose, but it is still content based. In fact, the Court
might even say that it is a category of speech that warrants less than
full First Amendment protection . ... ,,14 But, he wisely concludes, "it
is simply wrong to say that a facial, content-based distinction is other-
wise because it is based on a permissible purpose."248
The Pap's plurality's choice to make that mistake is the final link
in a chain of extreme deference to the social policy choices of mu-
nicipalities. First, the Supreme Court made it simple for municipali-
2 This confusion is revealed when the plurality doubly argues that
[T]here is nothing objectionable about a city passing a general ordinance to
ban public nudity (even though such a ban may place incidental burdens on
some protected speech) and at the same time recognizing that one specific
occurrence of public nudity-nude erotic dancing-is particularly problem-
atic because it produces harmful secondary effects.
Id. at 295. They make this case despite the fact the Erie did not advance an incidental
burdens theory.
2 See id. at 294 ("This case is, in fact, similar to O'Brien, Community for Creative Non-
Violence, and Ward."). But see id. at 324 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The plurality is also
mistaken in equating our secondary effects cases with the 'incidental burdens' doctrine
applied in cases such as O'Brien; and it aggravates the error by invoking the latter line
of cases to support its assertion that Erie's ordinance is unrelated to speech.").
246 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of Speech:
Problems in the Supreme Court's Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 59-61 (2000) (discuss-
ing the Court's willingness to find clearly content-based laws content-neutral).
247 Id. at 61.
248 Id.
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ties to use a nebulous secondary effects justification without any evi-
dentiary basis or relationship between those effects and the regula-
tion. Then the Court made it clear that it would characterize such
regulations as content-neutral despite the fact that they were aimed at
the effects of speech long held to be protected. Finally, by conflating
doctrines, the Pap's plurality communicates to municipalities that even
though they need to use secondary effects to justify their law, the
Court will put that justification aside and employ a less stringent ana-
lytical framework originally designed for the completely different
situation of after-the-fact incidental burdens on symbolic speech. 49
The route to a total prohibition ends with a Pap's/O'Brien test that
allows a virtually hypothetical furtherance of an assumed governmen-
tal interest to satisfy the demands of the First Amendment.50 Al-
though the Court credits the "O'Brien test," the single standard that
has developed "is reallyjust a weak version of the TPM test" that allows
restrictions where it did not before.2 1  By locking secondary effects
and the symbolic speech/incidental burdens test in this dangerous
dance, the Pap's plurality moves perilously further away from anything
but the most deferential analysis of restrictions on protected nude
dancing. As Susan Williams aptly concludes, " [t] hese two lines of par-
allel doctrinal development, then, have miraculously ended in a single
point .... As a result, the range of doctrinal tools available to deal
with complex first amendment problems has been reduced, and real
first amendment protections have been lost.
2 5 2
E. Tension with United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group
Pap's is also at great tension with the Supreme Court's recent deci-
sion in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group. Playboy involved a
challenge to section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,24
which required cable television operators, who provide channels pri-
249 This conflation poses a danger for all types of protected speech. For example,
Timothy Tesluk suggests that "hate speech could easily be recast as involving a 'fight-
ing words' element analogous to conduct, thus triggering the weak symbolic speech
test." Tesluk, supra note 10, at 1126.
250 See Pap's, 529 U.S. at 318 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Indeed, the plurality opin-
ion concludes that admittedly trivial advancements of a State's interests may provide
the basis for censorship.").
251 Williams, supra note 47, at 654.
252 Id. at 653-54.
253 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
254 Telecommunications Act of 1996, § 505, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 136 (codi-
fied at47 U.S.C. § 561 (Supp. III 1997)).
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marily dedicated to sexually oriented programming, to either scram-
ble fully or otherwise block fully those channels or to limit their
transmission to hours when children are unlikely to be viewing. 55 The
section was specifically directed at sexually oriented programming and
was enacted to address the phenomena of "signal bleed."25 6 Playboy
Entertainment Group challenged the law as a content-based regula-
tion violative of the First Amendment.251 Similar to the nude dancing
in Pap's, the content of the sexually oriented channels was admittedly
protected by the First Amendment as nonobscene adult entertain-
ment.
25 8
Because of the law's specific aim, the majority agreed with the
lower court that the law was content-based and found it an unconstitu-
259tional restriction on protected speech. One might argue then that a
comparison of Pap's to this case is of little value-apples and or-
260
anges. I argue, however, that it is the spirit of the two cases that
produces conflicting visions of underlying First Amendment values.
The effect of the laws in the two cases is markedly similar. In Playboy,
the Court highlighted that the effect of section 505 "limited Playboy's
market as a penalty for its programming choice, though other chan-
nels capable of transmitting like material are altogether exempt."261 In
Pap's, the general nudity law had the very same effect on owners of
fully nude dancing establishments-it limited their market simply be-
cause those owners chose to offer fully nude dancing as a program-
ming choice, while other clubs were free to present dancers with pas-
ties and G-strings. In fact, the effect of the law upheld in Pap's is
much stronger, as it in fact eliminated an entire market across the
board. The Pap's plurality used the convenient vehicle of the secon-
dary effects doctrine to remove the Erie law to the realm of content-
neutral restrictions, but the essence of the effect of the laws is strik-
255 Playboy, 529 U.S. at 806.
256 Id. Signal bleed occurs when, from time to time, discernable pictures appear
on the screen and/or audio may be heard through the scrambling. Id.
257 Id. at 807.
258 Id. at 811 ("All parties bring the case to us on the premise that Playboy's pro-
gramming has First Amendment protection."). But see id. at 829-30 (Thomas, J., con-
curring) (arguing that at least some of the programming could be prohibited entirely
under Miller v. California); id. at 831 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (maintaining that section
505 could be justified as regulating the "business of obscenity").
259 Id. at811-12.
260 Indeed the majority declares its zoning cases (e.g., American Mini Theatres and
Renton) to be irrelevant because the secondary effects doctrine requires lower scrutiny
than the content-based issue at hand. Id. at 815.
261 Id. at 812 (emphasis added).
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ingly similar.
Yet, the result is strikingly different. The Playboy Court extols that
the general "right of expression prevails," and that we should simply
262avert our eyes. Moreover, in applying strict scrutiny, the Playboy
Court demanded that any less restrictive alternative must be em-• 263
ployed. But the Pap's plurality, again through the vehicle of secon-
dary effects, did not even demand a consideration of less restrictive
means-it in fact endorsed what is essentially a total ban.
The Playboy Court is careful to stress that its case involves speech
alone. 26' This determination highlights the mistake of the untenable
Pap's conclusion that erotic dance contains both speech and non-
speech elements that can be independently targeted. The Court, in
essence, dictates that televising nude dancers on Playboy is speech
alone, but having them dance live on a stage is both speech and con-
duct. Phrased differently, a cablecast of Erie's live dancers would be
legal, but the dancing itself would not. This distinction is more than
difficult to explain-it is bizarrely without merit.
26
1
A comparison of Playboy and Pap's illustrates how the secondary ef-
fects doctrine, coupled with an exclusive governmental purposive
analysis, has warped the Court's perception of First Amendment pro-
tection. By ignoring the effect of the general nudity law on the audi-
ence, and allowing a content-neutral distinction based on an assump-
tion of secondary effects, the Pap's decision has the same
constitutionally offensive effect as section 505 in Playboy; yet, the plu-
rality is willing to settle for glaring inconsistency. The decisions make
remarkably different content discrimination determinations despite
highly analogous expression-suppressive effects. These disparate de-
terminations undercut a primary First Amendment value: "[f] reedom
of speech calls for wide and stringent protection for those who speak,
or write, or otherwise communicate to the public-protection notjust
for the words they choose, but also for the means of producing and
262 Id. at 813 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).
263 Id.
264 Id. at 814.
265 This point was recently explored by commentators who observed that "[t]he
same genre of expression was subjected to drastically different judicial treatment."
Verrilli & Maynard, supra note 220, at 12. Indeed, the authors astutely indicate the
irony of the two decisions: "The Court afforded erotic expression the least protection
in the setting in which the expression was least likely to be available to minors or to
large audiences, live entertainment in adults-only establishments, whereas the Court
aggressively protected such expression when transmitted over mass media." Id. at 17.
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distributing their speech."
266
It is unsatisfying to chalk up this result to differences in wording.
Justice Kennedy's discussion of the First Amendment's grand protec-
tions in Playboy is markedly absent from Justice O'Connor's plurality
opinion in Pap 's.267 Several commentators have appropriately decried
these discrepancies, questioning how laws that have such a similar ef-
fect can receive completely different treatment under the First
Amendment.268 By taking the secondary effects doctrine on such a
runaway ride, the Court makes its own pronouncements in Playboy
sound hollow-conveniently ignored when a good enough excuse (or
269policy preference) wanders along.
F. Wrong Turn or True Orthodoxy?
It is worth mentioning a final perspective before concluding this
discussion-that of the increasingly popular "new critics," as termed
by Nicholas Wolfson.2°  New critics-drawing on Plato and John
Stuart Mill-attack an absolutist view of the First Amendment by citing
the need to order a "good and just society. '27' Wolfson uses Willmore
Kendall as an example of this counter to the idea that the First
Amendment makes society a "debating club." Kendall and others dis-
agreed, arguing that "[s] ocieties ... cherish a whole series of goods-
among others.., the living of the truth they believe themselves to
embody already."272 New critics believe that a First Amendment driven
society will "descend... into progressive breakdown of those common
266 FISS, supra note 2, at 71-72 (emphasis added). In this collection of essays, Fiss
elaborates a theory of the First Amendment as, primarily, an instrument of democratic
self- overnance.
Justice Kennedy joined Justice O'Connor's opinion in Pap's, making the result
even more perplexing. Pap's, 529 U.S. at 282.
268 Verrilli & Maynard, supra note 220, at 12.
269 "[T]he American legal community is like an alcoholic staunchly promising to
stay sober, but allowing for one glass-or two, at most-of scotch. After all, all things
in moderation-including freedom of speech or thought." WIRENIUS, supra note 149
at 121.
270 In this Section, I rely heavily on Nicholas Wolfson's description of the modem
attacks on the traditional, civil rights position on free speech. See NICHOLAS WOLFSON,
HATE SPEECH, SEX SPEECH, FREE SPEECH 11-45 (1997).
271 Id. at 27. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC reprinted in THE PORTABLE PLATO 353
(Scott Buchanan ed., 1977) (proclaiming the value of censorship to ensure the
achievement of objective goods).
272 WOLFSON, supra note 270, at 26 (citing Willmore Kendall, The "Open Society" and
its Fallacies, in ON LIBERTY: ANNOTATED TEST SOURCES AND BACKGROUND CRITICISMS
162 (David Spitz ed., 1975)).
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premises upon which alone a society can conduct its affairs by discus-
,,273sion. More specifically, new critics argue that once a consensus
truth is reached by society, it is the responsibility of that society's
democratic government to "sustain true belief and wipe out false opin-
ion., 274 Stated differently, there are "true orthodoxies on which courts
can reach closure ....,,75
It is tempting (and in fact is regularly suggested by some promi-
nent scholars) to assert that society has simply reached a valid consen-
sus that certain forms of adult expression are of the lowest possible
value. This conclusion carries with it the implication that holdings
such as Pap's neither misapply existing doctrine nor realize particular
policy preferences; rather, they are realizations that a free speech
"truth-seeking" has occurred, and further, that an ordered govern-
ment should be allowed to implement the resultant true orthodoxy.
Once society determines a particular form of expression is "false," and
will lead to harm,276 suppressive Pap's-like results become much more
acceptable, if not lauded.2"
Wolfson posits the best response to the new critics:
[Theirs] is a principle impossible to contain. In the first place, it is im-
possible to achieve infallibility in the judgment that a consensus has
been reached. Since dissent itself is at issue, there will always be those
dissenters who insist that truth has not been ascertained. Second, even if
only one individual in all mankind disagrees on an issue, to use the fa-
mous Mill example, the truth cannot be said to have been infallibly as-
certained. Third and most important, once we grant that society can in-
fallibly pick certain opinions as "noxious," censorship will quickly extend
to all areas that majorities, or powerful minority interest groups, con-
sider dangerous.278
273 Id. at 26-27.
274 Id. at 30.
275 Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
276 For an objective investigation of the quantifiable harms of adult expression, see
SUSAN M. EASTON, THE PROBLEM OF PORNOGRAPHY: REGULATION AND THE RIGHT TO
FREE SPEECH 10-41 (1994).
277 The works of Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin are good examples
of the argument that a particular type of expression, whether it be sexist speech or
pornography itself, is inherently "false" and the bearer of harm. See, e.g., ANDREA
DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 201 (3d ed. 1981) ("The fact that
pornography is widely believed to be 'depictions of the erotic' means only that the de-
basing of women is held to be the real pleasure of sex."); CATHERINE A. MACKINNON,
ONLY WORDS 9 (1993) ("Protecting pornography means protecting sexual abuse as
speech, at the same time that both pornography and its protection deprives women of
speech, especially speech against sexual abuse.").
278 WOLFSON, supra note 270, at 30-31.
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The First Amendment, Wolfson argues convincingly, "must permit
grotesque and nasty speech, because society in the domain of speech
cannot be half skeptical and half infallible."279 In other words, we as a
society cannot infallibly choose the subjects that are "legitimately de-
batable and those that are not."
280
If, as Wolfson suggests, "[o] nce we accept that debate and inquiry
must end in certain areas, we cannot limit that principle,"2 ' then it is
impossible to consider movement toward true orthodoxies as an ac-
ceptable First Amendment value. Governments acceptably regulate
harmful conduct. When the government regulates speech on the
same grounds-concluding it to be false and thus harmful-it con-
fuses speech with action. The inevitable conclusion, Wolfson posits, is
pervasive censorship. 82 This argument illustrates a steep slope of a
sort somewhat different from the normatively weak, time-worn fear
that courts cannot distinguish between laws that censor completely
different types of expression. The new critics' slope is the acceptance
of "a fundamental proposition that there are certain orthodoxies that
a society and a government must accept and enforce in order to main-
tain worth and dignity."28 3 The subtle difference is that those ortho-
doxies mandate censorship, rather than suggest its possibility. The
conceptual acceptance in Pap's of the orthodoxy that adult expression
is, in essence, both speech that is unnecessary in our society and
speech that causes direct harms through cognizable secondary effects,
takes a dangerous step toward acceptance of the new critics' search for
enforceable orthodoxy. This, in turn, moves us back toward "the or-
der of mind that free speech advocacy was designed to overthrow."
284
V. REEVALUATING FIRST AMENDMENT ADULT EXPRESSION DOCTRINE
Adult expression doctrine has become an unstoppable suppressive
force in spite of the free speech guaranties of the First Amendment.
Six major problems arise in the wake of the unfortunate plurality
279 Id. at 31.
280 Id.; see also RiCHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OFJURISPRUDENcE 466 (1990)
(suggesting we should be "particularly wary of people who claim to have found the
truth and who argue that further inquiry would be futile ... [A] fallibilist theory of
knowledge emphasizes, as preconditions to the growth of... knowledge, the continual
testin and retesting of accepted 'truths"').
28 WOLFSON, supra note 270, at 31.
282 Id. at 132.
283 Id. at 24.
284 Id.
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opinion in Pap's. First, the Pap's plurality enshrines the secondary ef-
fects doctrine as justification for a general prohibition of protected
speech contrary to the intentions of the doctrine as a limited ap-
proach to time, place, or manner restrictions. s5 Second, an implausi-
ble application of content discrimination analysis by the plurality re-
sults in a content-neutral determination that ignores the practical
effect of general laws on protected speech. In bending doctrine to get
a desired result, the plurality has undermined the basic underlying
theoretical framework that justified First Amendment content dis-
crimination analysis in the first instance. Third, the Pap's decision en-
trenches an analysis that focuses solely on governmental purpose, at
the expense of the audience viewpoint so critical and particular to the
protected expression of nude dancing. Since this form of entertain-
ment is not popular among the American majority, is not considered
to be "high-value" speech, and arguably provides limited stand-alone
contributions to American society as a whole, it is only in the very
minds of its particular audience that this uniquely erotic expression
has its desired effect. As such, the plurality allows a plainly majori-
tarian attack on unpopular speech to be disguised by jurisprudential
smoke and mirrors.
Fourth, the Court has strayed far from the path of a rationally rea-
sonable secondary effects doctrine in two ways. It continues to absolve
municipalities of any responsibility to provide an evidentiary basis for
their justifications. At the same time, it allows the most irrational re-
medial means to be coupled with those secondary effects--even if they
are both far-fetched and unlikely to have any real impact. In combi-
nation, the Court has given municipalities carte blanche to create a
secondary effects fiction on both ends of the spectrum-justification
and means. Fifth, by conflating what originated as two distinct lines of
First Amendment doctrine into one weak standard, the Court effec-
tively sanctions the elimination of alternative avenues of communica-
tion, threatening all forms of expression with total prohibition at the
hands of the secondary effects fiction. Finally, the Court's reasoning,
rationale, and underlying First Amendment commentary in Pap's is, in
effect, strangely and jarringly at odds with other statements by the
Court on the underlying priorities of First Amendment doctrine and
common understandings of vital First Amendment values.
285 It is also a departure from the entire original purpose of obscenity law in gen-
eral, which, as a sui generis deviation from First Amendment freedoms, was "undoubt-
edly far less concerned with the impact of erotic materials on overt behavior than with
their impact on internal moral standards." EMERSON, supra note 38, at 499.
THE MRST AMENDMENT GONE A WRY
Several adjustments need be considered by the Court to both con-
tain this runaway line of doctrine and to better adapt it to the particu-
larized needs of adult entertainment analysis. Since the avenue to a
total ban is now clear, the Court must at the very least consider both
the governmental purpose behind a law and the direct discriminatory
impact such a law would have on the availability of a particular form of
expression to its viewing audience. It should not be enough for the
Court to dismiss a law's effects as merely de minimis in the larger
scheme of adult entertainment, for such a conclusion defies the very
need for a particular remedial action. In addition, if the Court con-
tinues to sanction the possibility of totally prohibiting a particular
form of expression, it has a positive obligation to consider actively any
and all evidence of improper motive as a safeguard against abuse.
Proactively probing a law for illicit intentions (especially when plain
evidence exists in the record) is necessary in this particular context to
preserve the Court's overall stated commitment to honoring core First
Amendment values.
If the Court remains determined to sustain the secondary effects
justification, it should take active steps to bring it back from the land
of make-believe. The Court should seriously consider splitting the
secondary effects test and incidental burdens/symbolic speech tests
back into their different selves. Doing so would realize the clear de-
sires of the American Mini Theatres and Renton Courts to preserve alter-
native avenues for protected expression while making some conces-
sion to majoritarian morality by allowing moderate restrictions on
adult entertainment. After parsing the two analytical frameworks in
keeping with their original justifications, the Court should then im-
plement a two-prong secondary effects nexus requirement. First, the
Court should require a demonstrable factual nexus between the sec-
ondary effects claimed and the means proposed to ameliorate them.
Second, the Court should also require a rational relationship between
the regulation (means) and the actual furtherance of the governmen-
tal interests in question. The first prong addresses the need for an
underlying factual basis for concluding that a restrictive law is neces-
sary, while the second assures that a law bears directly upon only those
demonstrated problems.
Finally, the Court should evaluate whether the path chosen in
Pap's-the potential for total prohibition of heretofore protected ex-
pression-gels with its larger body First Amendment jurisprudence, or
whether the Court's longstanding sympathy for objection to "im-
moral" expression finally got the better of it in Pap's. The Court,
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frankly, needs to revisit and rediscover its First Amendment first prin-
ciples and attempt to place Pap's within that framework or discard it as
an aberration.
CONCLUSION
The plurality has tried to do with its nude dancing doctrine in
Pap's what it could not do under Miller v. California: give municipali-
ties the ability to eliminate what they perceive to be nonobscene but
offensive adult entertainment. Unfortunately, the Court has long
conceded that such entertainment is entitled to constitutional protec-
tion. As a result, the Court has had to contrive an elaborate set of de-
cisional rules to circumvent the First Amendment in order to arrive at
the desired suppressive result.
The Pap's decision illustrates how implausible, untenable, and
dangerous that path has become. It is dangerously close to failing the
"laugh test" measuring rationality, and already requires a healthy
imagination to even sound plausible. In 1991, commentator Kimberly
Smith made a most cogent conclusion about the danger of lowering
the hurdles for regulating adult expression:
The perceived danger of sexual speech is not the view it espouses, but
the words or symbols themselves. Our emotional reaction to sexual
speech, like our reaction to the word "fuck," stems not from the idea it
expresses, but from the violation of social taboos; it is a matter of cul-
tural effrontery. There is a risk that this emotional reaction will motivate
excessive government censorship of all discussion on the topic, regard-
less of the viewpoint expressed.
Such fears are closer to reaching fruition now in many ways; the
plurality in Pap's allowed an entire medium of expression to fall under
the executioner's blade. Surely the Court does not want this limited
line of doctrine eventually to swallow whole the master values of First
Amendment protection.
287
286 Kimberly K. Smith, Comment, Zoning Adult Entertainment: A Reassessment of
Renton, 79 CAL. L. REV. 119, 143 (1991).
287 This fear was enunciated shortly prior to Pap's by James Weinstein, who de-
scribed the "potentially significant indirect cost of modifying current doctrine to per-
mit such bans-a general weakening of the constitutional protection afforded debate
on matters of public issues." SeeJAMES WEINSTEIN, HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND
THE RADICAL ATTACK ON FREE SPEECH DOCTRINE 159-88 (1999) (urging the need to
delineate a "confinable principle" to prevent the gutting of core free speech protec-
tion); see also Gey, supra note 174, at 1565 ("The more significant problem with the
pro-suppression position is that it cannot be limited to pornographic expression; it
provides a broader rationale for suppressing deviant expression of many sorts.").
THE HRST AMENDMENT GONE AWRY
The forthcoming consideration of City of Los Angeles v. Alameda
Books, Inc.2 8 indicates a pressing need for heightened recognition of
the problems implicit in the Pap's plurality's permissive analytical
2819
structure that I have discussed herein. In Alameda Books, the Court
examines whether a city may ban multiple-use adult businesses based
on a secondary effects rationale when it relies on a study that only ex-
amined the harmful effects caused by a clustering of many different
adult businesses. Below, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
almost altogether avoided discussing Pap's and, returning to the guid-
ing principles of Renton and American Mini Theatres, determined that
Los Angeles did not have a sufficient evidentiary nexus tying multiple-
use adult businesses to actual adverse secondary effects on their sur-
rounding areas.290 This case provides a ripe opportunity for the Su-
preme Court to regain control of a runaway doctrine, and serves as a
further call for a return to the fundamental First Amendment values
which preceded the under-performing content discrimination frame-
work embraced by the Pap's plurality.
In Sable Communications, the Court refused to allow the govern-
ment to "bum the house to roast the pig" through a complete ban of
indecent commercial telephone communications.291 In Reno v. ACLU,
the Court refused to allow the CDA to "torch a large segment" of the
Internet to shield a portion of the population from adult expres-
292
sion. In Playboy, the Court reminded us that "[w] hat the Constitu-
tion says is that these judgments are for the individual to make." 93 In
Pap's, however, the plurality allowed a general law to eliminate an en-
tire form of expression without much regret, forgetting what Justice
Frankfurter termed the need to bar legislation "not reasonably re-
stricted to the evil with which it is said to deal." 94 The Court should
heed its own warnings and bring adult expression jurisprudence back
288 City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 222 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2000), cert.
granted, 69 U.S.L.W. 3591 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2001) (No. 00-799) (argued Dec. 4, 2001).
289 Id.
290 See Alameda Books, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 222 F.3d 719, 724-27 (9th Cir.
2000) (holding that a city ordinance prohibiting the operation of adult businesses vio-
lated the First Amendment). The Ninth Circuit panel limited its mention of Pap's to
one footnote, noting it is of "little aid." Id. at 727 n.7.
29 Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127 (1989) (quoting
Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)).
292 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 882 (1997).
293 United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000).
294 Butler, 352 U.S. at 383.
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from the perils of Pap's by reembracing the First Amendment in a
more doctrinally compelling and objectively convincing manner.
